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Abstract
Informational interventions have been shown to significantly change behavior across
a variety of settings. Is that because they lead subjects to merely update beliefs in
the right direction? Or, alternatively, is it to a large extent because they increase
the salience of the decision they target, affecting behavior even in the absence of
inputs for belief updating? We study this question in the context of an informational
intervention with school parents in Brazil. We randomly assign parents to either
an information group, who receives text messages with weekly data on their child’s
attendance and school effort, or a salience group, who receives messages that try to
redirect their attention without child-specific information. We find that information
makes parents more accurate about student attendance, and has large impacts on their
test scores and grade promotion relative to the control group. Even though salience
messages, in contrast, do not make parents more accurate about attendance levels,
learning outcomes in the salience group improve by at least as much. Why? We show
that treated parents across both conditions become more accurate about changes
in their children’s grades over time, although not about grade levels. Such coarse
belief updating is consistent with independent information acquisition in response to
salience effects from both interventions. Our results have implications for the design
and interpretation of informational interventions across a range of domains.
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1 Introduction
In 2012, Vitória da Conquista – a municipality in a poor Brazilian State – spent over USD
700,000 on microchips embedded in public school students’ uniforms. Their hope was to
decrease truancy by informing parents in real-time when their children missed classes.1
This policy was inspired by the success of informational interventions in affecting many
fundamental economic decisions, including those linked to improved educational outcomes.2
Having said that, it is unclear whether those interventions work because of the specific
information they convey, tailored to the circumstances of the recipient. Alternatively, it
could be that those work mainly because such messages make particular issues top-of-mind,
i.e. they induce recipients to refocus their attention on the salient issue that is addressed by
the informational intervention.3 If that is the case, then salience interventions that do not
require recipient-specific information (such as nudges) may do equally well – and perhaps
even better. In fact, it could even be that those interventions induce individuals themselves
to collect the relevant data such that they update beliefs in the correct direction, much
the same way as informational interventions would do, except that at much lower cost for
implementers (no microchips needed!). This paper provides first-hand evidence for this
mechanism outside the lab.4
Whether such mechanism is quantitatively important matters. After all, salience inter-
ventions have the advantage of demanding less or no information and, thus, requiring less
knowledge by policy-makers. What is more, if refocusing attention is the key mechanism,
salience interventions are bound to have even larger effects than information disclosure.
The reason is two-fold. First, informational interventions are constrained by the frequency
at which information is available (often only at low frequency in developing countries like
Brazil), while nudging can be implemented at much higher frequency; in fact, our results
show that the frequency of messaging matters greatly in the context of communication
with school parents.5 Second, nudges also allow for additional features to manipulate at-
tention; for instance, our results show that redirecting attention to student attendance in
general improves educational outcomes across different classes, in contrast to conveying
child-specific information about math attendance – which affects student outcomes only in
this particular class.
1http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-17484532 (accessed on October 11, 2020).
2Information about children’s school effort increases parental monitoring and improves learning out-
comes (e.g. Bergman, 2021), information about labor market returns to education increases enrollment
and educational attainment (Jensen, 2010), information about employees’ productivity makes turnover of
low-productivity staff more likely (Rockoff et al., 2012), and information about husbands’ support for fe-
male labor market participation increases investments in labor market skills (Bursztyn et al., 2018), among
many other applications.
3To that point, in Dizon-Ross (2019), parents randomly assigned to receive information about their
children’s school performance substantially change educational investments, even though such data were
already available to them before the experiment through children’s scorecards.
4Gabaix et al. (2006) documents that receiving news directs subjects’ attention within a lab experiment;
Ambuehl et al. (2017) shows that certain types of financial education messages – those that emphasize
abstract benefits rather than specifying concrete actions – affect behavior without affecting financial knowl-
edge in an online experiment.
5Section 7 discusses the limits of this argument.
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To study this question, in the context of communication between schools and parents,
the ideal experiment would evaluate the impacts of sending parents information about
their children’s attendance while holding their attention fixed. But this is impossible;
information disclosure presumably always attracts attention (Golman and Loewenstein,
2018; Loewenstein et al., 2014). What we do instead is compare parents who receive
information to other parents whose attention is manipulated while their beliefs about their
children’s behavior are not made more accurate. To do that, we randomly assign parents
to either school messages that contain child-specific information or to school messages that
try to direct their attention to the behaviors reported on – without, however, conveying
child-specific information. The idea is that, by comparing the two groups of parents, the
experiment allows us to capture the additional effects of information on parent’s beliefs
and behavior above and beyond those that operate through the salience mechanism (if
any).
Communication between schools and parents is a great setting to study this question
for the following reasons. First, because of a clear moral hazard problem between parents
and children: as children grow older, their goals may drift increasingly apart from those
of their future-oriented parents; moreover, it becomes progressively harder for parents to
observe children’s effort at school (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Heckman and Mosso, 2014).6
Second, because there are objective dimensions of children’s effort (such as attendance)
on which we can report or to which we can direct parents’ attention. Third, because of
administrative data on school outcomes (such as standardized test scores), which we can
use to track the impacts of the experiment above and beyond surveying parents about their
beliefs and behavior.
Concretely, in the experiment – across 287 schools in São Paulo, Brazil, encompassing
19,300 ninth graders –, math teachers provide weekly information about their students’
behavior (attendance, punctuality and homework completion) through a platform over the
course of 18 weeks. Taking advantage of a partnership with an edtech startup7, we ran-
domly assign parents to different messages within each classroom, shared by the platform
over text messages (SMS). Some parents receive child-specific information (e.g.: “Nina
missed between 3 and 5 math classes over the last 3 weeks"), some receive a salience
message, emphasizing the importance of paying attention to that dimension (e.g.: “It is
important that Nina attends every math class"), while others receive no message at all
(the control group). While the salience message potentially conveys additional informa-
tion (although not child-specific; e.g. on social expectations about parenting), the message
with child-specific information presumably does the same.8 Last, because we anticipate
that parents’ or peer interactions may generate large spillovers, we randomize treatment
6To that effect, poor parents in Brazil prefer conditional cash transfers that mandate school attendance
– such that parents get notified when students miss over 15% of classes – to unconditional ones (Bursztyn
and Coffman, 2012). Consistent with the moral hazard mechanism, such preference disappears when
schools systematically share information about their children’s attendance.
7Movva (http://movva.tech) delivers nudges to engage parents in their children’s education across Brazil
and Ivory Coast (as of 2019). One of the authors (Guilherme) is Movva’s co-founder and chairman.
8See section 3.1 for a detailed discussion.
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assignment at two levels: within classrooms and across schools, including a pure control
group.
Before our experiment began, parents were quite inaccurate about their children’s
school effort: the correlation between beliefs about absences and actual absences in math
classes, reported in children’s scorecards, was only 0.21 (no different across treatment
arms). The intervention did what we set it out to: by the end of the school year, the
correlation between beliefs and absences reported by teachers through the platform was up
to 0.39 in the information group – a 45% increase in accuracy relative to control parents
within each classroom. In contrast, in the salience group, parents were no more accurate
about their children’s absences at the end of the school year – if anything, the correla-
tion between beliefs and absences was 21% lower in that group, consistent with the idea
that these messages introduce noise, resulting in a flatter relationship between beliefs and
actual absences relative to the control group.
Using administrative data on educational outcomes, we find that the informational
intervention has large impacts on attendance (2.1 percentage points, or about 5 additional
classes a year; a nearly 1/5 reduction in absenteeism), math GPA and standardized test
scores (0.09 standard deviation; equivalent to leapfrogging 1 quarter ahead in school) and
grade promotion rates (3.2 percentage points; a 1/3 reduction in grade repetition), in line
with previous findings (Bergman, 2021; Berlinski et al., 2016; Rogers and Feller, 2016). We
find that treated parents ask their children systematically more about school, incentivize
studying to a greater extent, and have higher aspirations about their children’s making it
to college, and that children in treated households report engaging in academic and reading
activities to a greater extent.
Strikingly, most of the effects of information are driven by salience: messages without
child-specific information improve outcomes by 89-126% relative to those in the information
group. What is more, we show that the effects of salience are even higher than those of
information among students with lower attendance at baseline – presumably, those whose
parents would benefit the most from information.
How can it be that children improve by as much in both treatment arms if parents be-
come more accurate about attendance levels in one condition, but no more so in the other?
We document that an important mechanism might be information acquisition triggered by
salience effects. We find that treated parents become more accurate about changes in math
GPA over time, relative to the control group, consistent with both interventions mobilizing
parents to acquire themselves decision-relevant information. This is the case even though
text messages did not communicate child-specific grades; in fact, even child-specific infor-
mation does not make parents more accurate about GPA levels.9 In this context, updating
beliefs in the right direction – even if only coarsely – is enough to improve learning out-
comes by the same magnitude as interventions that deliver information on grades directly
to parents (e.g. Berlinski et al., 2016). To that effect, we find that, just as in Dizon-Ross
9This is also not merely an artifact of school effort being correlated with grades, since parents’ accuracy
about student attendance moves in different directions across treatment conditions.
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(2019), while child-specific information increases inequality across children – in particular,
it makes educational outcomes worse for low-effort children relative to control students
within the same classroom –, salience messages do precisely the same.
Are salience effects only relevant in the short-run, e.g. because parents stop paying
attention over time? If anything, our results suggest the opposite is true: at least within
the 4-month horizon of our study, the effects of salience messages not only persist, but
even increase over time: the gap between the salience group and the pure control group
increases between the third and the fourth quarters both with respect to math attendance
and GPA – despite no mechanical reason for compounding, since outcomes are computed
within each quarter.
Results are robust to a series of alternative explanations. Randomly varying the sat-
uration of parents assigned to the information treatment across different schools, we rule
out that salience effects are driven by spillovers from the informational intervention. As-
signing a subset of parents to finer-grain information (which frames child-specific school
effort relative to the classroom median, along the lines of Rogers and Feller, 2016) also
has statistically identical effects to those of salience messages, ruling out that results are
driven by the intervention not being ‘informative enough’. Last, assigning an SMS nudge
program to a different sample of parents (targeting them directly with weekly suggestions
of activities to do with their children, without ever involving teachers), we rule out that
results are driven by the fact that, in the main experiment, teachers had to fill in a platform
each week with information about their students.
Our findings are consistent with parents setting investments in their children’s educa-
tion subject to attentional constraints. An additional experiment provides further evidence
to support that mechanism: we find that salience effects significantly increase with the fre-
quency of nudging (the effect size of 3 nudges per week on math attendance is nearly 2-fold
that of child-specific information), and that nudges that are not subject-specific improve
outcomes across both math and Portuguese classes, while the effects of math-specific infor-
mation or math-specific salience messages are confined to math attendance and grades.
Together, these results suggest that the effects of informational interventions could be
obtained at lower cost – and even magnified – by interventions that manipulate attention,
raising the salience of the decision they target. This insight may well extend beyond
education: just like parents who receive information about their child’s school effort react
to the salience of monitoring, employers may react to the salience of firing low-performing
employees in face of information about their performance (as in Rockoff et al., 2012), clients
with late payments may react to the salience of enforcement in face of information about
how default affects their future access to credit (as in Bursztyn et al., 2019), and customers
may react to the salience of purchasing a good in face of information about its benefits (as
in Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015).10
10In Bursztyn et al. (2019), where the largest reduction in default rates is caused by messages highlighting
the consequences of default for future access to credit, authors point out that they “(...) cannot directly
assess the extent to which this treatment provides new information as opposed to bringing customers’
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More broadly, our findings relate to an active literature connecting salience to belief
updating (e.g. Bordalo et al., 2012, 2019; Enke et al., 2019; Hanna et al., 2014), extending
that logic to the effects of informational interventions themselves. They also qualify the
interpretation of previous results about the effects of informational interventions, partic-
ularly in the context of communication with parents (Bergman, 2021; Dizon-Ross, 2019;
Jensen, 2010). Last, while a recent literature posits that the effects of information can
be non-trivial when it redirects attention (Golman et al., 2017; Golman and Loewenstein,
2018; Loewenstein et al., 2014), this paper not only provides first-hand evidence for this
mechanism outside the lab, but also shows that it can be quantitatively important.
2 Education in Brazil and São Paulo State
Like most Latin American countries, while Brazil has achieved significant progress over the
last 20 years in making basic education universal (over 98% of 7-14 year-olds are enrolled), it
still struggles with educational quality.11 To that point, the eight Latin-American countries
that took the 2015 PISA exam scored at the very bottom of the 65 participating countries,
and were outscored even by those with much lower per capita income. Brazilian 15 year-
old students scored 121 points below the OECD average in math, what is equivalent to a
two-year lag in math skills.12
Education in Brazil is supervised by government offices across municipal, state and
federal levels. Municipalities are responsible for early childhood education and primary
schools, State governments are responsible for middle schools and high schools, and the
federal government is responsible for college education (besides a few special secondary
education programs ran by federal institutes) and for regulating private educational insti-
tutions at all levels.
São Paulo is the wealthiest and most populous Brazilian State, and its educational
system encompasses the largest number of students in the country. According to the
Educational Census from the Brazilian Ministry of Education, enrollment in São Paulo
State amounted to 5.3 million primary and middle school students in 2015. Among those,
700,000 were ninth graders, 63% of which served by schools directly administered by the
State authority. Despite being a relatively wealthy State – accruing to 40% of country’s
GDP –, São Paulo features high inequality in access to education: while wealthy families
typically enroll their children in higher-quality private schools, public schools typically
attention to something they already knew ” (p. 1644, emphasis added). In Allcott and Taubinsky (2015),
authors recognize that “[i]t is thus not unreasonable to assume that (...) the conditional average treatment
effect on willingness-to-pay from our information treatments equal the average marginal bias from imperfect
information and inattention” (p. 2503, emphasis added).
112015 National Household Survey (PNAD), Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
Primary school enrollment is mandatory in the country for children between ages 6 and 14.
12The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an ongoing triennial survey that
assesses the extent to which 15 year-old students approaching the end of middle-school have acquired key
knowledge and skills that are essential for productive engagement in modern societies. Around 540,000
students took the assessment in 2015, a representive assessment of about 29 million students across 72
participating countries.
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serve students from disadvantaged backgrounds. In our sample, over 50% of households
earn less than 3 minimum wages (about 900 USD as of September, 2017), within the
income range of slum dwellers in the State capital. As such, public school students tend
to perform particularly poorly: in 2015, São Paulo State’s public middle-school students
scored 4.7 out of 10 in the National Index for the Development of Basic Education (Ideb)
– which averages math and language standardized test scores, penalizing that average
by grade repetition rates –, falling short of its already extremely modest target (5.0) for
middle-school students in the State.
Poor educational outcomes emerge as a combination of poor infrastructure, low teacher
value-added, and low family engagement in students’ school life. Across OECD countries,
20% of students report that they had skipped a day of school or more in the two weeks
prior to the PISA test. In Brazil, that figure was 48%. Strikingly, according to the 2015
National Survey of Students’ Health, about 1 in every 4 parents do not know whether
their child skipped classes, about 1 in every 3 parents do not systematically ask their
child about problems in school, and about 1 in every 2 parents do not regularly ask about
homework. Consistent with those statistics, in focus groups, public school teachers often
cite low family engagement as the leading cause of students’ poor school performance.
Engaging parents in this setting is hard: before the pandemic, the leading communi-
cation technology between schools and parents was still handwritten notes sent through
students themselves, who may not face the right incentives to ensure the message gets
through. Even though basically every parent could be reached via phone, cost control
measures by Education Secretariats to prevent excessive spending by schools have made it
such that their land lines often carry heavy restrictions on calls to mobile phones.13 Above
and beyond communication constraints, information on students’ effort or performance in
school is often not readily available to be shared. In most States, no real-time digital in-
formation systems are in place to track students’ attendance or school behavior. Teachers
keep daily records on paper, but typically only upload such information into centralized
school systems at the end of the school year.
3 Empirical strategy
This section introduces our empirical strategy. We start with a conceptual framework
in subsection 3.1 to set the ground for the design of our experiment. Informed by that
framework, subsection 3.2 describes the experimental design to isolate the salience effects
of informational interventions. We describe the platform that teachers fill in weekly in
subsection 3.3, followed by a summary of the outcomes we draw upon, from administra-
tive sources to survey data, in subsection 3.4. Next, subsection 3.5 presents descriptive
statistics of our sample, including a discussion about selection into the study and balance
13Less than 30% of Brazilian households own landlines, while 93.4% of them own mobile phones, accord-
ing to the 2015 National Household Survey (PNAD). While mobile phone penetration is high in Brazil,
that of internet and smartphone apps is not: about 55% of active lines are not systematically connected
to the internet (Regional Study Center to Information Society Development, CETIC).
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across treatment conditions. Last, subsection 3.6 describes the equations we estimate, our
treatment of standard errors, and how we deal with multiple comparisons.
3.1 Conceptual Framework
The ideal experiment to study this research question would compare parents who receive
child-specific information to other parents whose beliefs about their children’s school ef-
fort are manipulated while their attention is held fixed. Such experiment is, however, not
feasible; information disclosure presumably always attracts attention (Golman and Loewen-
stein, 2018; Loewenstein et al., 2014). Hence, to study this question, what we do instead is
compare parents who receive information to other parents whose attention is manipulated
while their beliefs about their children’s behavior are held fixed. This alternative comparison
approximates the ideal experiment by isolating the mechanism of interest, along the lines
of Ludwig et al. (2011).
How could one implement this mechanism experiment outside the lab? What we do
in our context is to randomly assign parents to either school messages that contain child-
specific information or to school messages that try to direct their attention to the behaviors
reported on – without, however, conveying child-specific information. The idea is that, by
comparing the two groups of parents, the experiment allows us to capture the additional
effects of information on parent’s beliefs and behavior above and beyond those that operate
through the salience mechanism (if any).
Concretely, salience messages emphasize that the dimensions of student effort we weekly
report on in the information group (attendance, punctuality and homework completion)
are important (e.g. “It is important that Nina attends math classes / arrives on time
in math classes / hands in math homework everyday”). We match the school behavior
addressed by the salience and information messages every week.
Framing salience messages in this way might raise concerns, in that claiming that a
behavior is important might change preferences or beliefs above and beyond making that
dimension top-of-mind. The reason why we think this is the appropriate framing is three-
fold. First, informational interventions presumably do the exact same thing: being targeted
by a message from the school likely makes recipients regard this dimension as important –
potentially affecting their preferences and beliefs just as much.14
Second, alternative framings would only imperfectly approximate those salience effects.
For instance, a reminder (e.g. “You can learn about your children’s attendance by asking
their school”) is presumably not surprising at all, and would be unlikely to draw attention
comparably to the informational intervention.15 Alternatively, a message offering parents
14In our experiment, we can test directly if parents’ beliefs are affected by the salience intervention;
in particular, do salience messages lead parents to infer that their children are putting in low effort at
school? Section 4 shows that is not the case: salience messages do not systematically affect the slope of
the relationship between parent’s beliefs and student attendance at end line.
15In fact, as Bursztyn et al. (2019) documents, simple reminders might not approximate well the effects
of informational interventions. Moreover, reminders might just as well change recipients’ preferences or
beliefs above and beyond making that dimension top-of-mind.
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the opportunity to receive attendance information over SMS conditional on their reply is
indeed likely to make attendance salient. Having said that, such message would induce
at least some parents to actually reply, making it unfeasible to disentangle the effects
of the child-specific information they requested from those of salience without resorting
to deception (by denying some parents access to the piece of information advertised in
the original message). This is so because of selection in who takes up the information
offer, preventing one from merely restricting the sample to those who do not reply. To
avoid deception, the task of introducing additional variation to affect parents’ likelihood
of replying to the text message would once again bring about the challenge of intervening
without affecting their preferences or beliefs directly – a challenge that has no obviously
satisfying fix.
Third, the idea that we could send salience messages to all treated parents, and child-
specific content in addition to the information group, would fail to cleanly separate the
effects of information from those of salience. The reason is that, in the presence of inatten-
tion, additional messages would likely induce larger treatment effects even in the absence
of child-specific information. This is exactly what we document in Section 6: in an ad-
ditional experiment, effect sizes on attendance and grades increase with the frequency of
messaging. Incidentally, other studies have documented that message length also matters
for the effects of informational interventions (e.g. ?). For those reasons, we send exactly
the same number of messages across treatment conditions and carefully design messages
to have approximately the same number of characters in each case.
3.2 Experimental Design
All details of the experimental design and a pre-analysis plan were pre-registered at the
AEA RCT Registry on June 26, 2016 (AEARCTR-0001379).16
3.2.1 Within-classroom randomization
In the experiment, across 287 schools in São Paulo, Brazil, encompassing 19,300 ninth
graders, math teachers had to fill in a platform weekly with information about their stu-
dents’ behavior (attendance, tardiness and homework completion). Within each class-
room, we randomly assigned parents to different messages, shared by the platform weekly
over text messages (SMS): some parents received child-specific information, some received
salience messages emphasizing the importance of attending to the child’s school behavior,
while others received no message at all (the control group). The assignment was held fixed
over the course of the experiment. Messages were designed to be simple and clear, and
to have as close as possible number of characters across treatment arms. Comparing in-
formation and salience students to control students allows estimating the extent to which
16See Supplementary Appendix I for the pre-analysis plan in full, including an account of deviations
from pre-registration. A preliminary version of this paper was circulated under the title “What Is It About
Communicating With Parents?”.
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the effects of child-specific information are driven by salience, as discussed in the previous
subsection.
We restricted communication to student effort in math classes. While standardized tests
cover both math and Portuguese, the Education Secretariat thought that math teachers
tend to keep more accurate records, and would have an easier time using the online platform
relative to Portuguese teachers. The particular dimension of student effort targeted by
information and salience messages alternated weekly, rotating across three dimensions:
attendance, punctuality and homework completion. We decided to rotate across those
dimensions for three reasons: (1) because teachers already measure them weekly (although
only on paper; data entry into the Secretariat’s system only takes place at the end each
quarter, or even at the end of the school year in some cases), (2) because the Education
Secretariat thought it was important to inform parents about all of them (rather than
just about attendance), and (3) because we thought it would be less likely that teachers’
usage of the platform would die out over time if they had to report on a different behavior
every week (making it seem less like just replicating the work they already do on paper).
The exact wording of the salience messages varied slightly every cycle, in an attempt to
prevent spam-avoiding behavior by parents, and in line with the goals of the mechanism
experiment discussed in the previous subsection. For the full script of messages sent for
each treatment arm, see Supplementary Appendix A.
Parents of all treatment arms only received text messages if the teacher filled in the
platform that week. This was true even for the salience arm, in order to avoid confound-
ing treatment effects with potential differences in teachers’ compliance across conditions.17
Perfect compliance with randomization protocols was ensured since our implementing part-
ner (Movva) had full control over enrollment (data on all participants had to be entered
by teachers into their system prior to the start of the experiment, and assignment was
conditional on enrollment) and over the messages ultimately sent to parents.
3.2.2 Identification concerns and two-level randomization
There are a number of potential concerns with inferring salience effects based on experi-
mental design outlined in the previous subsection. First, if parents already had reasonably
accurate information about their children’s school effort, or if parents found the informa-
tion conveyed through the text messages too coarse to update their prior beliefs, then
we might find no treatment effects of information to start with – making it unfeasible to
understand the extent to which those effects are driven by salience.
In the context of our experiment, both concerns are unfounded: Section 4 shows that
parents are dramatically inaccurate about their children’s attendance at baseline, and that
information makes them substantially more accurate at end line relative to the control
group. Having said that, we did not know which would be the case by the time we designed
17Teachers had until Sunday of each week to fill in information with respect to the past 3 weeks (see
the next subsection); parents received the message assigned to them always on the following Tuesday,
according to their treatment status.
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and pre-registered the study. For this reason, we included an additional informational
intervention in a sub-sample of schools (randomly assigned; see below), in which parents
were targeted by more informative messages – framing information on student behavior
relative to the median of their classmates (e.g. “most students in Nina’s class missed
less than 3 classes in the previous 3 weeks”), analogous to Rogers and Feller (2016).18 The
platform automatically computed each classroom median behavior once teachers submitted
information on all their students, each week. Comparing the effects of salience messages to
those of relative information allows us to estimate the relevance of salience effects in face
of a more demanding counterfactual.
i. Control: No messages
ii. Child-specific information: Messages with child-specific information about atten-
dance, punctuality and homework completion
iii. Salience: Messages highlighting the importance of school attendance, punctuality
and homework completion
iv. Relative information: Messages with child-specific information about attendance,
punctuality and homework completion framed relatively to their classmates’ median
behavior
Sample messages by treatment arm
Child-specific information Salience Relative Information
Eric missed less than 3 math classes
over the last 3 weeks.
It is important that Guilherme does
not miss math classes without good
reason.
Nina missed less than 3 math classes
over the last 3 weeks. Most students
in her classroom did not miss any
math class.
A second concern is spillover effects within classroom. If the interventions causally
improve treated students’ educational outcomes, a variety of mechanisms could lead control
students within each classroom to indirectly benefit from those. In particular, control
students’ learning outcomes could improve because of their interactions with now higher-
effort peers (e.g. Bennett and Bergman, 2021; Sacerdote, 2011), because their parents
change behavior due to their interactions with treated parents (who presumably change
behavior in response to information or salience messages), or because teachers increase
effort in response to higher-achieving pupils (perhaps even specifically towards control
students, to ensure they do not fall behind in the classroom). In the presence of spillovers,
using within-classroom control students as a counterfactual would lead us to under-estimate
18Rogers and Feller (2016) sends parents information about their child’s attendance relative to their
classroom’s modal behavior. Using child-level information as the comparison group, findings point out that
relative information has significantly higher impacts on students’ educational outcomes in US schools. We
use median behavior instead since it is presumably much easier to understand; to that point, the mode
of the distribution had to be explained graphically in Rogers and Feller (2016), a feature that technically
cannot be combined with text messages.
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treatment effects. Incidentally, spillovers might also lead us to under-estimate differences
between the effects of information and salience messages, specifically if parents in the
salience group talk to other parents about the messages, and infer child-specific information
from those conversations thanks to the information treatment.
To deal with those concerns, our design randomizes the interventions at two levels.
First, across schools – randomly assigned to different sub-samples, each associated with
a specific saturation of the information and salience interventions.19 Those include a
pure control group (schools where no student is assigned to either information or salience
messages) and a no information group (schools where students are only assigned to salience
or control). Second, within classroom, randomizing students across treatment arms en
suite with the saturation assignment at the school level.20 Comparing students assigned
to the information and the salience groups to those in the pure control group allows us to
estimate treatment effects parsing out potential spillover effects on control students within
each classroom. In turn, comparing students assigned to the salience intervention across
the no information group and the regular sample allows us to estimate salience effects while
parsing out potential spillover effects from the information treatment on those students.
Importantly, other than pure control schools, neither school principals nor teachers were
aware of differences in assignment between schools, or of child-specific assignments within
schools.21
While relying on the pure control group as a counterfactual allows estimating the effects
of interest while parsing out spillovers, it brings about additional concerns. Teachers in
pure control schools did not have to fill in the platform (in order to avoid deception, or
poor compliance once teachers eventually realized that information was not being delivered
to parents). As such, having to input information into the platform could have induced
teachers in the regular sample to change effort relative to pure control schools (e.g. if
enough of them think that the school principal or parents might monitor them to a greater
extent now that data on student effort is available at high frequency). If that were the case,
one would over-estimate treatment effects of both information and salience messages when
using the pure control group as a counterfactual – potentially compromising the external
validity of our findings, particularly when it comes to the effects of salience messages as
one considers the policy version with no data entry by teachers.
To deal with this concern, we include an additional sub-sample of schools in which
19Whenever there are multiple ninth-grade classrooms in a given school, we include all of them in the
experiment.
20We stratified randomization in two steps. In the first step, we stratified the assignment of schools to
sub-samples based on three school-level variables: their average math scores in the first quarter (measured
through the Education Secretariat’s internal assessment), their average student absenteeism rate, and their
share of parents enrolled to participate in the study. In the second step, we stratified the assignment of
students to treatment arms within classroom based on their first quarter math scores (in the Education
Secretariat’s internal assessment). Not all students take this test (which is not mandatory). For students
with missing values, we predict their score based on a simple linear regression using all baseline covariates,
stratifying assignment based on predicted scores.
21Students in pure control schools were enrolled through the same process as those in other sub-samples.
What is more, principals of all schools, even in the pure control group, were allowed to use the platform
to send monthly communication to parents about school events; see Section 3.3.
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parents are assigned only to either nudges or to a control group.22 Nudges – which are also
delivered to parents weekly over SMS – do not require any inputs by teachers. Instead, their
content draws inspiration in READY4K (York et al., 2019), sharing weekly suggestions of
activities for parents to do with their children. Comparing students assigned to nudges to
those in the pure control group allows us to estimate salience effects parsing out potential
effects on teacher behavior due to the teacher platform.
We excluded those schools from the possibility of sending monthly communication to
parents (a feature used to convince schools in all other sub-samples to participate in the
study; see Section 3.3) since, in some schools, math teachers also handled this activity
(delegated by principals) – as the goal of this sub-sample was to shut down the possibility
of teacher effects. That decision, however, had a cost: the Education Secretariat required
us to work on a different region of the State whenever the communication platform was
not made available to principals. As a result, students in that sub-sample are not sta-
tistically identical to those in our other sub-samples; in particular, schools in that region
had relatively lower grades at baseline. To deal with those baseline differences, we take
advantage of the fact that our program only started at the second half of the school year,
comparing educational outcomes of different sub-samples before and after the program was
introduced. The differences-in-differences estimator identifies the causal effects of nudges
relative to the pure control group under the assumption that student outcomes would have
not have changed differentially across sub-samples over time in the absence of nudges. We
show evidence for the validity of this identification strategy in subsection 5.5.2.
The figure below summarizes our two-level randomization design. Sub-samples A
through C allow estimating the effects of the informational intervention and the extent
to which those are driven by salience; sub-sample D allows estimating the effect of salience
messages without potential spillovers from information; and sub-sample E allows estimat-
ing salience effects in the absence of teacher effects.23
22The saturation within those schools assigned 2/3 of students to nudges and 1/3 to the control group,
reflecting power calculations that had the subjects assigned to nudges involved in multiple comparisons.
23The design choice for sub-samples A through D reflects power calculations accounting for the hypothesis
of interest. In the case of sub-sample E, the sample reflects the demands of the Education Secretariat.
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3.2.3 Timeline
The school year in Brazil runs from February to December and is divided in four quarters,
with a winter break in July. The timeline of the experiment was as follows. Parents were
surveyed at baseline in mid-June, 2016, towards the end of the second quarter. All parents
in our sampled schools (including pure control ones) who consented to participate in the
study filled in basic characteristics of the child and their primary caregiver, followed by
a baseline phone survey. Schools and students were then randomized into the different
treatment arms, and teachers (other than in pure control and nudge schools) were trained
to fill in the platform, by the end of June.
Teachers started entering student data into the platform immediately after the winter
break. In turn, parents started receiving messages 3 weeks after classes resumed, since
messages in the information group always describe student effort over the 3 previous weeks.
Communication lasted until the first week of December, when final exams took place.
Standardized tests took place immediately before, at the very end of November. Students
were surveyed as part of preparation activities for these tests, the week before that. Parents
were surveyed at end line immediately after the end of SMS communication, during the
second week of December, 2016.
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3.3 Teacher platform
We created an online data entry platform specifically for the study, designed in a simple
and intuitive way such that schools could easily manage it.24 As discussed in the previous
subsection, math teachers from treatment schools were oriented to fill in the platform
every week with that week’s dimension of students’ behavior: attendance, punctuality or
homework completion, following the scale shown below, reflecting each student behavior
on that dimension over the past three weeks.25
Scale by dimension of student behavior
Attendance Punctuality Homework completion
1. Missed more than 5 classes 1. Was late in more than 5 classes 1. Did not complete any of the assignments
2. Missed 3 to 5 classes 2. Was late 3 to 5 classes 2. Completed less than half of the assignments
3. Missed less than 3 classes 3. Was late for less than 3 classes 3. Completed more than half of the assignments
4. Did not miss any class 4. Was not late in any class 4. Completed all the assignments
Scales across different dimensions were congruent – low (high) numbers meant low
(high) effort across all dimensions –, and the relevant scale for each week was always
visible in the platform, to minimize concerns with measurement error. The system required
teachers to fill in information on all students in the classroom each week. Teachers were
reminded to fill in the platform weekly over SMS. Teachers who failed to fill it in at any
given week received an SMS alert, noting that they had not entered student data that week
and encouraging them to do so in the following week. Principals received motivational
messages over SMS encouraging them to engage their teachers in the program, as well as
SMS alerts in case teachers’ compliance in the school was below an acceptable threshold.
As a result, average compliance was high – roughly two thirds of teachers filled in the
platform in any given week (see Appendix C).26
As mentioned, to incentivize schools to collect parents’ phone numbers and baseline
characteristics, we offered all schools (other than those in sub-sample E, where nudges
were randomly assigned) access to the platform such that they could send parents (infre-
quent)notifications about school events – limited to one notification per month. Once an
event was scheduled in the platform (using the principal’s credentials), the system would
send the SMS notification to parents one week before, and an SMS reminder one day prior
to the event.
2460% of Brazilian schools have access to internet, although typically only with very limited bandwidth
– often below 4 mbps, shared across staff and all student computers, if any. The online platform consumed
very little data, and could be accessed by principals and teachers from any computer or smartphone, even
outside of the school.
25Students have around six math classes per week.
26Despite some differences in data entry rates across the different sub-samples of schools where teachers
had to enter student data into the platform, results are robust to bounding procedures that account for
potential selection in unobservable student characteristics; see Appendix E.
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3.4 Data and outcomes
We rely on four different data sources to collect our outcomes of interest. First, face-to-face
survey data. At baseline (mid-June), we surveyed all parents who consented to participate
in the program on their socio-economic characteristics and those of their children. This
dataset comprises 15,597 observations, giving us access to a wide range of controls: primary
caregiver’s family tie with the student, their income bracket and educational achievement,
and their (and their child’s) gender, race and age. At end line (end of November), we
surveyed students face-to-face on their perceptions about their parents’ engagement in their
school life, their time allocation between leisure and study, their values and aspirations,
and their social and emotional skills. This dataset comprises 9,539 observations, reflecting
the fact that take-up of this final survey was optional (although strongly encouraged by
schools).
Second, phone surveys, collected via robot calls (Interactive voice response units, IVR)
and incentivized with airtime credit. At both baseline (mid-June) and end line (December),
we surveyed parents to elicit their parenting practices, beliefs about their child’s math at-
tendance and grades, and their demand for child-specific information on those dimensions.
Response rates of phone surveys were 23.2% at baseline and 25.8% at end line, typical
of that mode of data collection. Nevertheless, the sampling pool is large enough that we
still have a large number of observations to detect relevant treatment effects on parents’
beliefs and behaviors. The exact number of observations varies by outcome variable, since
non-response increases throughout the call. As such, phone survey outcomes range from
4,064 to 4,471 observations at baseline, and from 3,868 to 4,974 observations at end line.
Non-response was not differential across treatment arms (see Appendix B).
Third, administrative data from São Paulo State’s Education Secretariat: quarterly
data on students’ attendance and GPA in math and Portuguese classes, standardized test
scores in math and Portuguese (from the System of School Performance Evaluation of the
State of São Paulo, Saresp – a State-wide mandatory exam for 9th grade public school
students), and grade promotion status, across all sub-samples. Attendance is recorded in
percentage points (0–100). GPA ranges from 0 to 10 (only integers), with a passing grade
set at 5 points for all disciplines (failing one or more disciplines leads to grade repetition).
This dataset comprises 22,850 observations. It includes even students whose caregivers did
not opt in to participate in the program, allowing us to analyze the extent of selection into
the program based on students’ characteristics.
Fourth, weekly data on platform scores (rotating across attendance, punctuality and
homework completion, all with respect to the 3 previous weeks) for all sub-samples but pure
control schools and sub-sample E.27 This dataset features at least one week of attendance
data for 12,641 students, at least one week of punctuality data for 12,208 students, and at
least one week of homework completion data for 12,025 students.
27Teachers’ average compliance rate across sub-samples and weeks was roughly 66%; see Appendix C.
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3.5 Descriptive statistics, balance and selection
Table 1 presents the sample means of students’ and primary caregivers’ baseline character-
istics by treatment arm, along with p-values of ANOVA tests of equality of means across
groups. Panel A displays student’s characteristics and Panel B, those of caregivers.
[Table 1]
The table shows that 48% of students in our sample are girls and 40% are brown
or black – a little over the State average (35.6%, according to the 2010 Census) since
white families are typically wealthier in Brazil, and wealthy families typically send their
children to private schools. In fact, 59% of primary caregivers in our sample earn less than
3 minimum wages (about USD 750 at the time), within the range of low socioeconomic
status in the State. Students in our sample average 14.7 years old. Their math and
Portuguese 1st-quarter grades average 5.9 and 6.2, respectively (in a 0 to 10 scale, with
a passing grade of 5). 76% of primary caregivers are mothers, and those are, on average,
at their early 40s. 69% of them have no education beyond middle school; as such, 2/3 of
participating students are at least as advanced in school as their parents ever were.
The sample is balanced across treatment arms: out of 17 variables, only age features
statistically significant differences across groups, at the 10% level – which is expected to
happen just by chance – and numerically irrelevant. To that point, F-tests document that
baseline characteristics are not jointly different across groups, when it comes to either
students’ or caregivers’ characteristics.
Receiving messages from the school as part of parents’ participation in the study borne
no costs; parents just had to provide consent and a valid phone number, either directly at
parent-teacher meeting towards the end of the second quarter, or indirectly, by filling in a
paper form that students took home when parents were absent from the school meeting.
Over 66% of the 23,398 parents invited to participate signed up for the program.
Table 2 analyzes selection in opt-in. For parents who did not sign up, we have access
to only a few student characteristics from the Secretariat of Education administrative
records: their gender, age, math and Portuguese 1st-quarter attendance and grades, and
their family’s Bolsa Família’s beneficiary status (known to schools because a high-enough
attendance rate is part of the transfer’s conditionality).
[Table 2]
The table shows that parents who signed up for the program are from relatively better-
off households: their children had statistically higher attendance and grades, and they
were less likely to be Bolsa Família beneficiaries. Since any educational intervention that
requires parents’ consent is expected to have imperfect compliance, we focus throughout
on the average treatment effect on the treated. Having said that, Appendix B shows that
our results are robust to re-weighting observations by their inverse probability of opt-in.
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3.6 Estimation
To estimate the effects of the informational intervention and the extent to which those are
driven by salience, we estimate the following equation:
Ysci = α+ β1infosci + β2saliencesci + β3controls/∈{B},ci +
K∑
k=1
γkXscik + θs + εsci, (1)
where Ysci denotes the outcome of interest for student i in classroom c of school s;
infosci = 1 for students whose parents were assigned to child-specific messages, and 0
otherwise; saliencesci = 1 for students whose parents were assigned to salience messages,
and 0 otherwise; controls/∈{B},ci = 1 for the control group (other than in pure control
schools), and 0 otherwise – with pure control schools as the omitted category. Next, Xsci
is a matrix of student characteristics, including their gender, age and race, their baseline
attendance and GPA, and their parents’ gender, age, race, income and education; θs stands
for randomization stratum fixed-effects; and εsci is the error term.
Coefficients are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). We cluster standard-
errors at the classroom level, allowing for arbitrary correlation among residuals of students
under the same teacher. We are interested in testing β1 = β2.
When we estimate treatment effects on platform scores (Section 5.1), we omit the
within-classroom control category instead, as those outcomes were not collected in pure
control schools. When it comes to treatment effects on administrative educational outcomes
(Section 5.2), we start by estimating equation 1 only within sub-samples A and B. In
robustness checks, we augment this specification with an indicator variable for students
whose parents were assigned to child-specific information framed relative to their classroom
median, when including sub-sample C, and allow the salience coefficient to vary in sub-
sample D (where no parent is assigned to child-specific information).
Following our pre-analysis plan, treatment effects on administrative educational out-
comes are analyzed individually. In contrast, when it comes to platform scores, measures
of parental engagement, and students’ socio-emotional skills, we handle family-wise error
rates from multiple comparisons by computing standardized summary measures, following
Kling et al. (2007).
4 Effects on parent’s accuracy about student effort
This section tests whether the informational intervention indeed makes parents more accu-
rate about their children’s school effort, while the salience intervention does not. Subsection
4.1 starts by describing the distribution of parents’ beliefs about student attendance and




Parents’ beliefs about student attendance and grades were elicited (non-incentivized) through
our baseline phone survey. When it comes to attendance, parents were asked to provide
their best estimate of how many times their child had missed math classes over a typi-
cal three-week period. Their answers were then compared to administrative records on
students’ attendance over the first quarter.28 Parents had to choose which bracket best
approximated their estimate: no absences; 1 to 2 absences; 3 to 5 absences; or more than 5
absences.29 Parents were also asked to give their best estimate of their child’s 1st-quarter
math grade. Again, parents had to choose which bracket best approximated their estimate:
below average (0-5); adequate (5-6); good (7-8); or very good (9-10).
Figure 1 showcases the distribution of parents’ beliefs at baseline, contrasted with
actual student attendance and grades.
[Figure 1]
The figure shows that only about 1/3 of parents choose the correct bracket for either
their children’s baseline attendance or GPA in math classes. On average, parents are over-
optimistic about their children’s attendance: similarly to Bergman (2021), most parents
think that their child misses fewer classes than they actually do. While over 40% of
respondents think their child has missed no classes over the last 3 weeks, this is true
for only about 15% of the students. This sets the stage for the typical moral hazard
story, whereby information has parents monitor children more intensely (in face of lower
monitoring costs), increasing student effort, and ultimately improving learning outcomes
as a result. The next subsection provides direct evidence that parents indeed update their
beliefs in response to the informational intervention – but not in response to the salience
intervention.
4.2 Treatment effects on parents’ accuracy about effort levels
Throughout this subsection, we restrict attention to parents’ accuracy about student at-
tendance in math classes, since the intervention did not convey information about their
GPA. We defer the discussion of treatment effects on parents’ accuracy about student GPA
until Section 6.2, in the context of information-seeking behavior by parents.
Following Dizon-Ross (2019), we compute the correlation between parents’ beliefs and
children’s actual absences at end line, across the different experimental conditions. If
parents were perfectly accurate, that correlation would be equal to 1. At baseline, however,
the correlation between parents’ beliefs about their children’s absences in math classes over
28We asked about the 3 previous weeks to frame the question consistently with the information respon-
dents would (potentially) receive over text messages. Since attendance data from the Education Secretariat
comprises the entire span of the 1st quarter, we scale it down proportionately to generate its three-week
equivalent.
29See Supplementary Appendix J for the full script.
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the previous 3 weeks and children’s actual absences in that period was only 0.22.30 What
is more, even if parents were accurate at baseline, student effort cannot simply be inferred
from children’s previous school standing (made available through scorecards shared by
schools at the end of each quarter): the correlation between 2nd-quarter math GPA and
mean platform scores entered by teachers for control students over the course of the 3rd
and 4th quarters is only 0.54 for homework completion, 0.32 for attendance and 0.24 for
punctuality.
At the end line, we compute that correlation using children’s actual absences reported
by teachers through the platform, since that was the content parents in the information
treatment actually received. We ask parents to provide their best estimate of how many
times their child had missed math classes over the 4th quarter. Parents’ beliefs are dis-
cretized just as in Bergman (2021); they had to choose which bracket best approximated
their estimate: 0; 1-2; 3-5; 6-8; or more than 8 absences. In turn, teachers reported on
each student’s attendance every 3 weeks, specifying how many classes they missed over
that interval (missed 0, 1-2; 3-5; 5 or more). We compute actual absences as the average of
teachers’ reports over the 4th quarter, such that the exercise compares parents’ beliefs to
the exact information conveyed through the child-specific information treatment without
requiring additional computation.31
Figure 2 documents end-line correlations within each treatment arm through local
polynomial regressions, residualizing beliefs and actual absences with respect to all char-
acteristics of students and their caregivers that we observe.32
[Figure 2]
The figure shows that, similarly to the baseline correlation, the end-line relationship
between parents’ beliefs and children’s actual absences remains much flatter than the 45-
degree line in the control group. In turn, in the information group, Panel A shows that such
relationship is steeper : treated parents of low-absenteeism children become more optimistic
about their attendance relative to those in the control group, while the opposite is true at
the high-end of the absenteeism distribution.
Reassuringly, Panel B documents that the same is not the case for the salience inter-
vention: its local polynomial regression line basically coincides with that of the control
group over the entire range of actual absences.
30We have access to children’s actual absences over the 1st quarter – not over the 3 weeks prior to the
baseline survey. Since a school quarter lasts 9 weeks, we divide that figure by 3 to compute our actual
absences’ indicator. Measurement error due to the coarse categories made available for parents to express
their estimates, or due to systematic time trends in absences over that 9-week period, should be statistically
identical across treatment arms.
31Measurement error due to the coarse categories made available for parents to express their estimates,
or due to differences in the scales of beliefs and actual absences in this exercise, should be statistically
identical across treatment arms – and, hence, should not affect our estimates of treatment effects. See
Appendix D for additional details.
32We restrict the X-axis to the [0,3] interval in both panels since very few observations are in the (3,4]
range, rendering non-parametric estimates infeasible.
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Table 3 documents that those patterns hold in a regression framework. Columns 1 and
3 restrict attention to the information and the control groups (both within-classroom and
pure control), while columns 2 and 4, to the salience and control groups (both within-
classroom and pure control). Columns 1 and 2 document that the correlation between
parents’ beliefs and children’s actual absences is not statistically different across groups at
baseline, and columns 3 and 4 estimate treatment effects of information and salience on
that correlation, respectively.33
[Table 3]
Columns 3 and 4 show that, at the end line, information increases the correlation be-
tween parent’s beliefs and children’s actual absences from 0.31 to 0.42 (column 3; significant
at the 5% level). In turn, salience decreases it (by roughly 20% of the control average,
in column 4), although the effect is not precisely estimated. In sum, the informational
intervention does make parents more accurate, while the salience intervention does not.
5 Effects on educational outcomes
Having shown that the interventions affect parents’ beliefs as intended, this section docu-
ments treatment effects on educational outcomes. We present the effects of the interven-
tions on platform scores in subsection 5.1, and on administrative outcomes in subsection
5.2. Subsection 5.3 follows by estimating heterogeneous treatment effects of child-specific
and salience messages with respect to student effort (captured through the data entered by
teachers into the platform), to shed light on the nature of conditional impacts documented
in the literature. Next, subsection 5.5.3 estimates dynamic treatment effects, followed by
robustness exercises in subsection 5.5.
5.1 Treatment effects on platform outcomes within the classroom
On the first time teachers entered student attendance data on into the platform, only
34.6% of students had not missed any math classes in the 3 previous weeks; in fact, 20.7%
of them had missed 5 classes or more over that period. Homework completion was also
underwhelming: only 46.2% of students handed in all assignments in the 3 weeks prior to
the first time teachers reported on that dimension; 13% had not handed in assignments at
all. In turn, tardiness was much less of a problem: roughly 80% of students were never
late in any particular week when this dimension was reported on by teachers.
We estimate the effects of child-specific information and salience messages on students’
attendance, punctuality and homework completion in math classes, as entered by teachers
into the platform. To do that, we stack the data in a panel structure, and estimate the
effects of interest absorbing classroom fixed-effects and controlling for a linear time trend
33The number of observations differs across columns 1-2 and 3-4 because of differences in response
rates across the baseline and end-line phone surveys; non-response is not systematically different across
treatment arms; see Appendix B.
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(to account for systematic variation in student behavior as the school year draws to an
end). To avoid the issue of multiple comparisons in face of the different dimensions of
student effort, we compute a summary measure of platform scores (following Kling et al.,
2007), which takes the value of the dimension reported at each week, standardized with
respect to the mean and standard deviation of the control group. Table 4 presents the
results in column (1), as well as treatment effects on each of its components in columns
(2) through (4).
[Table 4]
Column 1 presents treatment effects on the summary measure of student effort. Salience
messages improve effort by 0.019 standard deviation (significant at the 5% level). Since
effort increases over the course of the school year, this effect size is equivalent to skipping
nearly 3 weeks ahead relative to control students. In turn, information does not significantly
increase student effort. Analyzing the effects on its components, treatment effects on the
summary measure are mostly driven by effects on attendance (column 2), which increases
by 0.031 standard deviation in response to salience messages (significant at the 1% level)
– an effect size nearly 3-fold that of child-specific information. For the other components
(columns 3 and 4), the estimates for information and salience effects are very similar
and not statistically different from zero, and we cannot reject that the effect sizes of the
interventions are statistically identical in all four columns (at the 10% significance level).
5.2 Treatment effects on administrative outcomes
Next, we estimate the effects of child-specific information and salience messages on stu-
dents’ 4th-quarter attendance in math classes, 4th-quarter math GPA, math standardized
test scores, and their likelihood of advancing to high school.34 Table 5 presents the results.
[Table 5]
Average 4th-quarter attendance in pure control schools is already reasonably high.
Students attend 87.5% of math classes in those schools; after all, 75% or higher attendance
is a requirement for grade promotion, and 85% or higher, a conditionality for Bolsa Família
payments. Nevertheless, information significantly increases it by 2.1 percentage points
(significant at the 1% level), an effect size equivalent to five additional classes (roughly,
a full extra week of math) over the course of the school year. Information also increases
math GPA by 0.071 standard deviation (significant at the 5% level), an effect size similar
to that of other SMS informational interventions (e.g. Berlinski et al., 2016). While math
GPA is computed from tests graded by the teacher herself, child-specific information also
significantly increases standardized test scores attributed by third-party graders, to an even
34The analyses restrict attention to students who were still in school by the end of the year, and who
had taken the standardized test, in each case. Supplementary Appendix B documents that our results are
not driven by selection.
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greater extent (0.107 standard deviation, significant at the 5% level). This is a large effect
size, equivalent to treated students finishing up the school year 1 school quarter ahead of
the control group.35 Those learning gains particularly benefit students on the margin of
failing math class, as child-specific information leads to a significant and sizeable increase
in the likelihood of advancing to high school: 2.6 percentage points (significant at the 5%
level), a nearly 1/3 reduction in grade repetition relative to pure control schools.
Strikingly, we find that salience accounts for the lion’s share of the effects of the in-
formational intervention. Not only do salience messages also significantly improve all
educational outcomes, but also, their effect sizes are always statistically identical to those
of child-specific information (at the 10% level). This is not a matter of statistical precision:
the ratio of salience coefficients to those of child-specific information is never below 89%.
Moreover, as in the case of platform scores (Section 5.1), salience effect sizes are sometimes
larger – up to 126% of those of child-specific information.36
Table 5 also shows that the interventions have large spillovers on control students
within the classroom: students whose parents were assigned not to receive messages within
classrooms where other parents were treated also improve systematically relative to the
pure control group, by as much or only slightly less than those assigned to child-specific
information or salience messages. While our research design cannot pin down the specific
nature of spillovers – potentially a combination of peer effects, parent interactions and
teacher effects –, Section 5.5 provides extensive evidence that the absence of differences
between the information and salience groups is not driven by such second-order effects of
the informational intervention.
Figure 3 plots the densities of math standardized test scores within each treatment arm
to show that the lack of differences between the average effects of child-specific information
and salience messages does not mask different patterns for their distributional effects.
[Figure 3]
The figure shows that the distributions of standardized test scores of students whose
parents were assigned to child-specific information or salience messages are equally shifted
to the right relative to that of pure control students. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects
the hypothesis that the salience and pure control test score distributions are the same (at
the 10% level), and fails to reject equality of the child-specific information and salience
distributions (p=0.94).
Since administrative outcomes other than standardized test scores have discrete ranges
(e.g. math GPA can only take integer values between 0 and 10), another way to analyze
distributional effects is estimating heterogeneous treatment effects according to students’
baseline educational standing. Table 6 replicates the analyses separately for students below
and above the median 1st-quarter math attendance.
35Based on comparing the average performance in SARESP of ninth graders and that of high-school
freshmen, and dividing the difference in averages by 4 to compute expected quarterly learning.




The table shows that, as in the main analyses, salience effect sizes are never statisti-
cally lower than those of child-specific information. Quite the contrary, salience effects are
actually higher than those of child-specific information among below-median attendance
students (significant at the 5% level for math GPA and grade promotion). Among those
students, the effect of salience messages is almost two-fold that of information on math
GPA (nearly 0.12 s.d.), and nearly 50% higher when it comes grade promotion. In effect,
the effect of salience messages on the likelihood of advancing to high school among stu-
dents with below-median attendance is 3-fold that among above-median students (p=0.02).
Those patterns are striking, as intuition suggests that these students would be the ones
most likely to benefit from informational interventions in face of parent-child moral hazard.
In sum, results suggest that salience interventions can do just as well as child-specific
information on average, and even better among students with lower attendance at baseline.
5.3 Conditional impacts
Dizon-Ross (2019) documents that higher accuracy leads to higher inequality: the in-
formational intervention decreases misallocation of educational investments, with parents
increasing (decreasing) investments in high-(low-)performing children, relative to the con-
trol group. Is it also the case when it comes to our informational intervention? How about
when it comes to salience messages? This subsection documents heterogeneity in treat-
ment effects on educational outcomes with respect to student effort, as captured through
platform scores.
We interact treatment indicators with the average score entered by teachers into the
platform for each student over the course of the experiment, estimating different regressions
for each dimension of student effort. We are interested in whether the effects of child-
specific information and salience messages vary systematically with average platform scores.
In Dizon-Ross (2019), parents of low-performing children reduce educational investments
relative to the control group, while the opposite is true for parents of high-performing
children. In our regression, that would be equivalent to a negative coefficient for the
treatment indicator, and a positive coefficient for its interaction with average platform
scores.
Appendix F documents heterogeneous treatment effects on educational outcomes condi-
tional with respect to student attendance, punctuality and homework completion. Because
teachers did not fill in the platform in pure control schools, estimates are relative to the
within-classroom control group, absorbing classroom fixed-effects. As one would expect,
higher attendance, punctuality and homework completion positively and systematically
correlate with better educational outcomes in Tables F.1-F.3. Although large spillovers
from the interventions on within-classroom control students make treatment effects hard
to detect, the Appendix documents interesting patterns for conditional impacts. For nearly
all outcomes across attendance, punctuality and homework completion, the coefficient of
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child-specific information is negative, and that of its interaction with average platform
scores, positive, consistent with parents ‘doubling down’ on students who are already do-
ing well as in Dizon-Ross (2019). Having said that, the exact same patterns also hold
when it comes to salience messages: its coefficient and that of its interaction with av-
erage platform scores have the same sign as those of child-specific information across all
columns in each table. In some cases, such conditional impacts are even larger and more
precisely estimated when it comes to salience messages, as in the case of treatment effects
on 4th-quarter math attendance conditional on student punctuality.
In our experiment, conditional impacts manifest mostly as negative treatment effects
on low-effort students targeted by the interventions, relative to low-effort students in the
control group. For instance, we estimate that the informational intervention decreases
the likelihood of advancing to high school by 9.6 p.p. for students who are always late,
and increase it by 0.5 p.p. for those who are never late.37 Symmetrically, we estimate
that salience messages decrease the likelihood of advancing to high school by 6.8 p.p. for
students who are always late, and increase it by 0.8 p.p. for those who are never late.38
How is it possible that the two interventions alike induce conditional impacts with re-
spect to student effort, when only child-specific information makes parents more accurate
about effort levels? Such patterns are consistent with two (non-mutually exclusive) po-
tential mechanisms – both distinct from parents re-optimizing in face of frictionless belief
updating. First, it could be that low-effort students react differentially to higher parental
engagement, which increases in response to both child-specific information and salience
messages, regardless of parents’ underling beliefs (see Section 6.1). Second, it could be
that both interventions lead parents to acquire information independently – along the lines
of “learning through noticing” (Hanna et al., 2014) –, changing educational investments in
response to updated beliefs about their children’s school performance. In fact, we show
that, in both treatment conditions, parents become more accurate about changes in math
GPA over time (see Section 6.2). We return to this discussion in Section 6.
5.4 Dynamic treatment effects
This subsection estimates dynamics treatment effects, taking advantage of the fact that we
have access to quarterly data on math attendance and GPA from the Education Secretariat
administrative records. We can test whether those outcomes did not vary systematically
across treatment and control parents before the onset of the interventions, and whether
treatment effects systematically increase or decrease over time.
This is particularly of interest for the effects of salience messages. Although we show
that those messages do not affect parents’ accuracy about student attendance at end line,
it could still be that parents initially react to salience messages because they (wrongly)
infer information from those. Specifically, if parents assigned to the salience intervention
37Respectively, -0.130 + (0.0338 x 1) = -0.0962 and -0.130 + (0.0338 x 4) = 0.0052, since teachers rate
student effort in each dimension from 1 to 4.
38Respectively, -0.0931 + (0.0252 x 1) = -0.0679 and -0.0931 + (0.0252 x 4) = 0.0077.
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think that they are getting messages because their children are putting in low effort at
school, they might disproportionately react to the intervention. As time goes by, however,
as more and more parents realize that this interpretation is unwarranted, they would
eventually stop reacting to salience messages, leading their effects to fade out over time.
This alternative story – which is consistent with no differential accuracy at end line and
better learning outcomes – would have important implications for the interpretation and
generalizability of our findings. This subsection allows us to test this hypothesis.
Figure 4 displays how math attendance (Panel A) and math GPA (Panel B) vary
quarterly within each treatment arm.
[Figure 4]
Panel A displays a downward trend for math attendance over the course of the school
year for all groups. The interventions, however, are able to partly mitigate that trend over
the third and fourth quarters. Differences between groups become significant only in the
3rd quarter, and persist into the 4th quarter. Most importantly, differences between the
salience and pure control groups increase over time: salience effect size increases from 1.3
to 2.1 percentage points from one quarter to the next. In Panel B, grades display an upward
trend over the second half of the school year for all groups, but particularly so for those
targeted by the interventions. As in the case of attendance, differences between the salience
and pure control groups increase over time: salience effect sizes of increases from 0.092 to
0.104 standard deviations between quarters.39 In both cases, there is no mechanical reason
for effect sizes to increase over time (e.g. compounding), since attendance and GPA figures
are computed within each quarter.
5.5 Robustness checks
This subsection assesses the robustness of our findings to the remaining identification
concerns discussed in Section 3.2.2. Subsection 5.5.1 explores whether conclusions change
when child-specific information is framed relative to classmates’ median behavior. Next,
subsection 5.5.2 investigates whether results are driven by spillovers from the informational
intervention on students whose parents were assigned to salience messages. Last, subsection
5.5.3 documents whether results are driven by teacher effects because of data entry into
the platform.
5.5.1 Are child-specific messages informative enough?
Is child-specific information really unnecessary, or did our experiment convey too little in-
formation to improve educational outcomes above and beyond the effects of making student
effort top-of-mind? As Rogers and Feller (2016) argues, while it might reasonably low-cost
39The slight difference between the salience effect size on 4th-quarter Math GPA in Table 5 and Figure 4
stems from the diff-in-diff specification in the latter, which nets out baseline differences across the salience
and pure control groups.
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for a parent to acquire information on their child’s school behavior, it might be much more
costly to figure out what is the relevant benchmark against which to compare it. This
subsection considers a more demanding counterfactual for salience effects, estimating the
effects of framing child-specific information each week against the backdrop of classmates’
median behavior.
Table 7 shows the results of a regression that also includes sub-sample C, where students
were randomly assigned into either control, salience, child-specific information, or relative
information. As discussed in Section 3.6, we augment equation 1 with an indicator variable
equal to 1 for children whose parents received child-specific information framed relative to
the classroom median, and 0 otherwise.
[Table 7]
The table shows that, similar to Rogers and Feller (2016), effect sizes of framing child-
specific information in relative terms tend to be larger than those of not doing so. That is
the case for math attendance and GPA, and notably for standardized test scores (an effect
size of 0.141 standard deviations, about 50% larger than that of information itself). The
exception is grade promotion, for which its effect size is actually lower, less than 60% that
of child-specific information alone.
Most importantly, when it comes to the comparison between salience and relative infor-
mation, the only instance for which their effects are statistically different is exactly grade
promotion – for which it is the effect size of salience that is higher (significant at the 10%
level). Even when it comes to standardized test scores, salience effects are still over two
thirds of the effect size of relative information, and they are statistically indistinguishable.
While results suggest that the finer child-specific information is, the higher its potential
to improve learning outcomes – at some point, possibly above and beyond the impacts of
salience messages –, they also suggest that salience is still likely to play a major role
behind its effects. In any case, the informational intervention we use throughout the paper
matches the typical structure of school-parents communication campaigns in developing
countries (as in Berlinski et al., 2016, which also finds a 0.09 effect size of an text-message
information program on students’ standardized test scores).
5.5.2 Are results driven by spillovers from child-specific information?
As discussed in Section 3.2, even with a pure control group, it could still be the case
that the salience and information treatments interact within treated schools. This is a
specific form of contamination across treatments that does not affect control students. It
could happen if parents in the salience treatment ask other parents about messages, and
infer from some of those conversations information about their own child’s school behavior
thanks to the information treatment. To test this hypothesis, this subsection investigates
whether salience effects are lower in sub-sample D, where students were assigned to either
salience messages or control – but not to child-specific information.
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Concretely, we estimate the following equation:
Ysci = α+ β1infosci + β2saliencesci + β3controls/∈B,ci
+β4saliencesci × 1{s ∈ D}+ ϕ1{s ∈ D}+
K∑
k=1
γkXscik + θs + εsci,
(2)
where 1{s ∈ D} = 1 if the school belongs to sub-sample D (50% salience, 50% control),
and 0 otherwise. We are interested in testing β4 ≤ 0.
Table 8 shows the results of estimating equation 2, allowing salience effects to vary
in schools where the informational intervention is absent. Panel A estimates differential
treatment effects of salience messages within the no-information sub-sample through an
interaction term, and Panel B estimates treatment effects of salience messages restricting
attention to that sub-sample and the pure control group.
[Table 8 ]
We find overwhelming evidence that salience effects are not driven by spillovers from the
informational intervention. If anything, salience effects are actually larger in the absence of
child-specific information, although differential effects are mostly statistically insignificant
at conventional significance levels.40
5.5.3 Are results driven by teacher effects?
As discussed in Section 5.2, spillover effects from the interventions on control students
within the classroom are substantial: those students experience almost as large effects on
math attendance and GPA, and statistically identical effects on standardized test scores
and grade promotion rates. Since we rely on pure control schools as a counterfactual –
where teachers did not have to enter data about student effort each week into the platform
–, an important concern is whether our results are driven by differences in teacher behavior
across different sub-samples. If that were the case, then attributing most of the effects of
informational interventions to salience would be misleading, and our findings would not
generalize in contexts where teachers are not responsible for high-frequency data entry.
There are two ways to address that concern. The first is to note that, even within
classroom, our interventions improve educational outcomes even relative to the within-
classroom control group: that is the case for the summary measure of platform scores
(significant at the 5% level), and marginally so for 4th quarter math attendance and
math GPA (p=0.161 and p=0.137, respectively; see Table 5). The second is to resort
to our additional experiment, in which we randomly assigned some students to nudges
(sub-sample E; see Section 3.2.2).
40The frequency at which teachers filled in the platform weekly was slightly higher in sub-sample D
than in other sub-samples (statistically significant at the 1% level; see Appendix B). Results are robust to
bounding treatment effects to account for selection; see Appendix E.
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In those schools, we randomly assigned participants to either control or nudges, reaching
parents directly without child-specific information or the need to involve teachers at all.
Nudges shared weekly suggestions of activities for parents to do with their children, also
through weekly SMS.41 Messages are not linked to curricular activities; rather, those try to
bring parents closer to their children’s school life by having them ask about school, discuss
future plans, and share how they dealt with similar issues back in the day. Nudges are
structured around bi-weekly sequences, inspired by READY4K! (York et al., 2019) (see
Supplementary Appendix A for sample sequences).
We estimate treatment effects of nudges relative to pure control schools, precisely be-
cause of large spillovers within classroom. The main identification challenge, as discussed in
section 3.2.2, is that students within sub-sample E were not statistically identical at base-
line to those of our main sample. The reason is that the Education Secretariat required
us to work in a different region whenever the teacher platform was not made available for
skills (for logistical reasons linked to training), and students had relatively lower 1st-quarter
math grades in that other region.
Even though we can control for a wide array of students’ and parents’ characteristics,
one may still worry that students of different profiles could have evolved differentially over
time due to unobservable factors that cannot be controlled for. To deal with this concern,
we take advantage of the fact that our program was ran only during the second half of the
school year, and use a differences-in-differences strategy to compare the evolution of the
different sub-samples, before and after the program was introduced. We restrict attention
to math attendance and GPA, for which we have quarterly data.
The differences-in-differences estimator identifies the causal effects of nudges under the
assumption that educational outcomes would not have changed differentially across nudge
schools and pure control schools in the absence of the intervention. While the identification
assumption cannot be tested, we can test whether outcomes across those groups varied
differentially over the first two quarters – before the onset of the program.
We estimate the following equation:
Yscit = α+ β1 (nudgesci × Postt) + β2 (controls∈E,ci × Postt)
+θPostt + γ1nudgesci + γ2controls∈E,ci + εscit,
(3)
where Yscit denotes the outcome of interest for student i in classroom c at school s on
quarter t; nudgesci = 1 for students assigned to nudges, and 0 otherwise; controls∈E,ci = 1
for students assigned to the control group within sub-sample E, and 0 otherwise; Postt = 1
if t ≥ 3, and 0 otherwise; and εscit stands for the error term. We are interested in testing
β1 = 0. We can also investigate within-classroom spillovers in the absence of teacher effects
by testing β2 = 0.
Table 9 estimates the effects of nudges on math attendance (column 1) and math GPA
41The program, Eduq+, is powered by edtech Movva (http://movva.tech).
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(column 2) using equation 3. Columns 3 and 4 estimate a placebo exercise, restricting
attention to the first two quarters – before the onset of the intervention –, and setting
Postt = 1 if t = 2, and 0 otherwise, to test for differential pre-trends between the nudge
and pure control groups.
[Table 9]
Columns 1 and 2 show that nudges have significant impacts on both outcomes, increas-
ing math attendance by 1.5 p.p. and math GPA by 0.12 s.d. relative to the pure control
group (both significant at the 1% level). Strikingly, nudges’ effect size on learning is 50%
larger than that of salience messages alone, suggesting that non-specific and more engaging
content can capture parents’ attention to a greater extent (see Section 6.3). Last, columns
3 and 4 document no differential pre-trends between the nudge and pure control groups
with respect to either attendance or GPA.
Figure 5 allows treatment effects to vary more flexibly over the course of the school
year, estimating non-parametric effects of nudges on math attendance (Panel A) and math
GPA (Panel B) relative to the pure control group with the first quarter as the reference
period.
[Figure 5]
Both panels confirm that differences between the nudge and pure control groups only
arise after the onset of the intervention. They also confirm the patterns we document for
dynamic treatment effects of salience messages (Section 5.4), as the effects of nudges do
not systematically decay between the 3rd and 4th quarters. Together, our findings rule
out that the effects of salience messages are driven by teacher effects.
6 Mechanisms
This section turns to the mechanisms behind treatment effects. We start by estimating
treatment effects on parents’ behavior and aspirations, and on students’ time use in subsec-
tion 6.1. Next, subsection 6.2 documents treatment effects on parents’ information-seeking
behavior, by studying their accuracy with respect to end-line math GPA – as the informa-
tional intervention never conveyed child-specific information on grades. Last, subsection
6.3 turns to attentional constraints, providing direct evidence that the frequency of messag-
ing and their content’s specificity affect the depth and breadth of their impacts on learning
outcomes.
6.1 Parental engagement and students’ time use
Why is it that the interventions improve student’s educational outcomes? To study this
question, we take advantage of end-line survey data on parents’ behavior and aspirations,
and on students’ time use. Students were asked 12 questions about how often (never, almost
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never, sometimes, almost always, or always) their parents typically engage in different
activities. We pre-registered that we would compute 3 summary measures of parental
engagement based on those questions (standardizing their components and averaging across
them within summary measure; Kling et al., 2007): academic activities (comprising help
with homework, help with organizing school materials, participation in school meetings,
and conversations with teachers); motivation (comprising words of incentives to attend
school, to be on time, to study, and to read); and dialogue(comprising conversations about
homework, about grades, about the day at school, and about classes). We also estimate
treatment effects on parents’ aspirations, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student
states at end line that their parents believe s/he would make it to college, and 0 otherwise.
Table 10 presents treatment effects on the summary measures of parental engagement and
aspirations.
[Table 10]
We find that both child-specific information and salience messages lead parents to ask
their children significantly more about school and to incentivize studying to a greater extent
than those in the control group. Moreover, both significantly induce higher aspirations
about their children’s making it to college. Across all columns, the effects of information
and salience are statistically indistinguishable at conventional significance levels.
Next, students were asked how many hours per day (0, 15 minutes, 30 minutes, 1
hours, 2 hours, more than 2 hours) they spend on a range of different activities. We pre-
registered we would compute 3 summary measures of students’ time use based on those
questions (standardizing their components and averaging across them within summary
measure; Kling et al., 2007): academic activities (studying at home on weekdays; studying
at home on weekends; studying at home the day before an exam); reading (reading a
book; reading the newspaper; reading magazines); and other activities (watching TV;
browsing the internet or on social media; and helping with house chores). Table 11 presents
treatment effects on those measures of students’ behavior.
[Table 11]
Students whose parents were assigned to either child-specific information or salience
messages report engaging in academic and reading activities to a significantly greater extent
than those in pure control school. Once again, across all columns, the effects of information
and salience are statistically indistinguishable at conventional significance levels.
As discussed in Section 5.3, the fact that parents’ and students’ behaviors respond alike
to child-specific information and salience messages could explain why we find conditional
impacts on educational outcomes with respect to student performance even if parents in the
salience group could not condition responses on more accurate beliefs about their children’s
attendance, punctuality and homework completion. That could be the case if low-effort
students responded differentially to higher parental engagement, resulting in worse grades
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and likelihood of advancing to high school relative to low-effort students in the control
group. We unfortunately do not have statistical power to test this hypotheses directly, by
estimating heterogeneous treatment effects on student time use with respect to student
effort, because of the large within-classroom spillovers of the interventions.
6.2 Information acquisition
Why does parental engagement and student behavior react just as much to salience mes-
sages as they do to child-specific information? This subsection documents that such pat-
terns are consistent with treatment effects on parents’ information-seeking behavior, an-
alyzing how the accuracy of parents’ beliefs about their children’s math GPA changes in
response to the interventions.
At the baseline phone survey, parents were asked to provide their best estimate of
their child’s 2nd-quarter math grade. Parents had to choose one out of four categories:
below average (0-4); adequate (5-6); good (7-8); or very good (9-10). At the end-line phone
survey, we asked parents to guess their children’s math GPA directly (open-ended, between
0 and 10). We build a 4-point scale variable for end-line beliefs equivalent to the baseline
variable.
We compute the correlation between parents’ beliefs and children’s math GPA at end
line, across the different experimental conditions. If parents were perfectly accurate, that
correlation would be equal to 1. Figure 6 shows, however, that this correlation is not only
much lower in the control group, but also, no higher in the information group (Panel A)
or the salience group (Panel B) – perhaps unsurprisingly, as none of our interventions con-
veyed child-specific information about grades. Next, we compute the correlation between
changes in parents’ beliefs and that in children’s math GPA between baseline and end line,
across the different experimental conditions. While in the control group that correlation
is nearly zero – parents seem to have very limited awareness of whether their children
are improving or deteriorating throughout the school year –, it is systematically higher in
both the information group (Panel C) and the salience group (Panel D). All in all, both
interventions lead parents to coarsely update beliefs: they come to understand that their
children’s grades are going up or down, even if they are still not any better in guessing by
how much, relative to the control group.
[Figure 6]
Table 12 shows that these patterns hold in a regression framework. Columns 1, 3 and
5 restrict attention to the information and the control groups (both within-classroom and
pure control), while columns 2, 4 and 6, to the salience and control groups (both within-
classroom and pure control). Columns 1 and 2 document that the correlation between
parents’ beliefs and children’s actual math GPA is not statistically different across groups
at baseline; columns 3 and 4 estimate treatment effects of information and salience on that
correlation; and columns 5 and 6 estimate treatment effects of information and salience
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on the correlation between changes in parent’s beliefs between baseline and end line and
changes in math GPA between the 2nd and 4th quarters.42
[Table 12 ]
Columns 3 and 4 confirm that neither child-specific information nor salience messages
make parents systematically more accurate about their children’s 4th-quarter math GPA.
In turn, both interventions make parents a lot more accurate about changes in math GPA
over time: child-specific information increases the correlation between changes in beliefs
and actual changes in math GPA by 2/3 (significant at the 1% level, column 5), and
salience messages, by nearly 50% (p-value = 0.125, column 6).
Results suggest that both interventions lead parents to acquire information indepen-
dently. While accuracy gains among parents targeted by child-specific information could
be partly explained by the fact that student attendance and math GPA are positively
correlated, our results suggest that roughly 70% of those gains are actually due to salience
effects; after all, parents in the salience group do not become more accurate about student
effort, but do so when it come to changes in math GPA between baseline and end line.
These results are also not an artifact of salience messages making parents merely less op-
timistic about their children’s educational outcomes: our results show that is not the case
for math attendance or GPA levels neither for changes in math GPA over time; moreover,
Figure D.1 shows that while most parents were in fact too optimistic with respect to their
children’s baseline attendance in math classes, the same was not the case with respect to
baseline math GPA – parents were roughly equally distributed across optimistic, accurate
and pessimistic before the intervention.
Last, Appendix H presents additional evidence on parents’ information-seeking behav-
ior, estimating heterogeneous treatment effects by parents’ willingness to receive informa-
tion (WTR), stated at baseline. Chassang et al. (2012) posits that subjects with higher
demand for the intervention should be precisely the ones who exert higher effort within the
setting of the randomized control trial. We document that, in our setting, that seems to be
the case regardless of the intervention: effect sizes of child-specific information are actually
larger among parents with low WTR, who might only independently acquire information
when primed by the salience effects of the intervention.
All in all, our findings are consistent with inattention and “learning through noticing”
(Hanna et al., 2014). As discussed in Section 5.3, this mechanism could explain why we find
conditional impacts on educational outcomes with respect to student performance even if
parents in the salience were no more accurate with respect to student attendance reported
by teachers through the platform.
42The number of observations differs across columns 1-2, 3-4 and 5-6 because of differences in response
rates across the baseline and end-line phone surveys, and in the number of subjects who answered both
surveys; non-response is not systematically different across treatment arms; see Appendix B.
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6.3 Attentional constraints
Last, while the previous results provide strong support for attentional constraints as the
main driver of the impacts we document, this subsection provides direct evidence of parents’
inattention. To do that, we turn to communication features of our intervention, exploring
random variation in (1) the specificity of the content of messages sent to parents (framed
around math classes, or otherwise), and (2) the frequency of messaging.
First, we study the extent to which subject-specific salience messages have effects con-
fined to that subject. Due to working memory limitations and heuristics such as asso-
ciativeness (Kahneman, 2011), the fact that child-specific information was restricted to
school behavior within math classes suggests its effects should be lower when it comes to
attendance and learning outcomes in Portuguese classes. In contrast, nudges should af-
fect math and Portuguese attendance and grades to a much more similar extent, as their
content was designed to be not subject-specific.43 Table 13 estimates treatment effects on
students’ 4th-quarter Portuguese attendance, GPA and standardized test scores (columns
1-3).44
[Table 13]
While estimated treatment effects of both interventions are positive across all columns,
effect sizes are much smaller and less precisely estimated than their counterparts for math
classes. In particular, the effect of both child-specific information and salience messages on
Portuguese standardized tests scores is less than half their effects on math standardized
test scores.
This is not merely because it is harder to improve learning outcomes in Portuguese
classes relative to math classes, as the evidence on the effects of nudges illustrates next.
Figure 7 documents treatment effects of nudges on math and Portuguese 4th-quarter at-
tendance (Panel A) and GPA (Panel B), using a differences-in-differences estimator (as in
subsection 5.5.2).
[Figure 7]
Panel A shows (restricting attention at first to the left-hand-side column of both panels,
which portrays effect sizes of one nudge per week) that nudges have significant effects on
attendance in Portuguese classes, which increases by 1.4 p.p. relative to pure control
schools. That effect size is twice as large as that of math-specific information or salience
messages. One nudge per week also increases Portuguese GPA relative to the pure control
group – a 0.09 effect size (significant at the 10% level), 50% larger than that of salience
messages.
43It could of course be the case that it is harder to affect learning in Portuguese than in math. But even
if that were the case, non-specific nudges would still provide the appropriate benchmark for salience effects
when content is not domain specific.
44As grade promotion depends on grades being greater than or equal to 5 across all subjects, we cannot
assess the extent of spillovers within student for that outcome.
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Second, we study the extent to which salience effects increase with the frequency of
messaging. Under attentional constraints, effects sizes should increase with the frequency
of communication if additional messages make it more likely that children’s school life
becomes top-of-mind. To study that question, we take advantage of an additional experi-
ment conducted in a companion paper (Bettinger et al., 2019). In that paper, we randomize
several features of communication with parents within sub-sample E (see Section 3.2.2),
including the number of nudges parents receive each week . Parents assigned to receive 1
message per week receive a weekly SMS with a suggested activity for them to do with their
child. Those assigned to 2 messages per week also receive a weekly SMS with a motivating
fact that prequels the activity with some simple foundations for why the latter should
support children’s learning. Those assigned to 3 messages per week also receive a weekly
SMS with a growth message, after the activity, incentivizing parents to do it regularly.
Figure 7 displays effect sizes of 1, 2 and 3 nudges per week on students’ math and
Portuguese 4th-quarter attendance (Panel A) and GPA (Panel B) using a differences-
in-differences estimator. It documents that effect sizes substantially increase with the
frequency of nudges, for both math and Portuguese. With 3 nudges per week, math atten-
dance increases by 2.7 p.p., 50% more than with 1 nudge per week. The same pattern holds
for math GPA, and when it comes to Portuguese attendance and grades: with 3 nudges
per week, the treatment effect of nudges on Portuguese GPA (0.15 standard deviation,
significant at the 1% level) is nearly two-fold that of 1 nudge per week. Interestingly, from
2 to 3 nudges per week, there are already some signs of saturation effects; in particular, the
effect size of 3 nudges per week is nearly identical to that of 2 nudges per week on math
attendance, and exactly identical when it comes to math GPA. Saturation is also consis-
tent with limited attention, as additional messages are not expected to draw additional
attention when the decision domain is already top-of-mind.
Together, results not only demonstrate that attentional constraints are the key driver
behind why child-specific information improves educational outcomes, but also corroborate
the claim that nudges can magnify the effects of informational interventions by drawing
on additional features to manipulate subjects’ attention.
7 Concluding Remarks
While interventions that inform parents about their children’s school effort tend to have
large impacts on educational outcomes, we show that alternative interventions that draw
parents’ attention to student effort without making them more accurate can improve learn-
ing outcomes by just as much. We find that salience effects are not short-lived, and that
they are not driven by interactions with information or by teacher effects. Our findings are
consistent with the effects of child-specific messages being driven by salience. In particular,
the extent to which educational outcomes improve in response to salience messages depends
on student effort just as much as in the information group – even though the former set
of parents had no direct inputs for belief updating. All in all, results are consistent with
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belief updating in the presence of attentional constraints.
Our findings contribute to a booming literature that investigates cost-effective interven-
tions to improve educational outcomes in developing countries.45 While different strategies
have been rigorously evaluated – from cash transfers (Baird et al., 2011; Barrera-Osorio
et al., 2011; Behrman et al., 2009; Mo et al., 2013; Schultz, 2004) to scholarships (Blimpo,
2014; Friedman et al., 2011; Kremer et al., 2009; Li et al., 2014) to increasing the quan-
tity and quality of teachers (Chin, 2005; Duflo et al., 2015; Urquiola, 2006; Urquiola and
Verhoogen, 2009) and school grants (Das et al., 2013; Lucas and Mbiti, 2014; Newman
et al., 2002; Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013; Pridmore and Jere, 2011) –, only a few have
been shown to improve student outcomes through easily scalable interventions. We provide
direct evidence that interventions that manipulate attention can induce at least as large
effects as informational interventions, and at a lower cost. The effects of more frequent
messaging are up to 2-fold those of weekly messages with child-specific information, and
nudges (especially at higher frequency) have significant impacts across both math and Por-
tuguese learning outcomes, while the effects of math-specific messages are mostly confined
to that subject.
In the context of the growing body of evidence that suggests that parents play a cru-
cial role in shaping their children’s behavior and school performance (e.g. Barnard, 2004;
Houtenville and Conway, 2008; Nye et al., 2006), our results qualify the findings of ex-
perimental evaluations of school communication with parents (e.g. Bergman, 2019, 2021;
Bergman and Chan, 2019; Berlinski et al., 2016; Castleman and Page, 2015; Dizon-Ross,
2019; Gallego et al., 2018; Jensen, 2010; Kraft and Dougherty, 2013; Rogers and Feller,
2016; York et al., 2019), suggesting that most of their effects could actually be driven
by salience.46,47 More broadly, our findings suggest that the effects of informational in-
terventions across a multiplicity of domains could be obtained at lower cost – and even
magnified – by interventions that manipulate attention, raising the salience of the decision
they target.
Having said that, in practice, not all informational interventions might be replicated
simply with messages that try to make the decision domain top-of-mind. For information
concerning fixed states of the world, which require no updating, or for information that is
easily available, understanding the extent to which the effects of informational interventions
are driven by salience becomes less relevant. Alternatively, for information that might be
45As Ludger et al. (2015) and others document, students in developing countries learn much less than
students of the same age or grade in OECD countries. In those countries, the focus has recently shifted
from merely increasing school enrollment to improving learning (Glewwe and Muralidharan, 2015).
46Differences in parental inputs are viewed as an important cause of intergenerational inequality (Becker
and Tomes, 1979), and family socio-economic status is a key factor behind variation in children’s educa-
tional achievement (Woessmann and Hanushek, 2011). While poor and rich families differ across many
dimensions, few seem as easy to address as their differential monitoring of children’s school performance.
47Our study also contributes to the still scarce literature on behavioral educational interventions. Recent
papers study interventions that tackle parents’ inertia and routine, (Avvisati et al., 2013; Banerji et al.,
2013; Benhassine et al., 2015; Harackiewicz et al., 2002; Kraft and Rogers, 2015), including text messages,
email reminders, and letters targeted at parents and students (Castleman and Page, 2015; Hoxby et al.,
2013; Jensen, 2010). While the field of behavioral economics has been successfully applied to many areas,
Education has received comparatively less attention so far (Lavecchia et al., 2014).
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prohibitively costly for individuals to acquire independently, such as major-specific returns
to college education (Hastings et al., 2015), salience might not be very effective in changing
behavior, as individuals might not come by the decision-relevant information even if they
actively search for it.
Moreover, manipulating attention is not trivial. Yeager et al. (2019) shows that an
online growth mindset intervention in US high schools improves math grades relative to a
comparable online intervention that does not address beliefs about intelligence. Bursztyn
et al. (2019) shows that while text messages sent by an Indonesian bank appealing to moral
values significantly reduce default, other messages from the bank (even those mentioning
payment reminders) do not. In those studies, even though belief updating is relevant and
information could be acquired independently by participants, messages that do not address
educational beliefs (in the former) or the moral implications of default (in the latter) might
have failed to capture subjects’ attention to the same extent as other interventions. As in
any policy evaluation, the devil is the details; ultimately, designing effective and scalable
interventions requires careful piloting and evaluation.
Last, when the effects of informational interventions are driven by salience, what can
we conclude about their welfare implications? The answer ultimately depends on how
salience affects the underlying decision process: if it expands consideration sets (such that
decision-makers attend to a broader set of alternatives), it must weakly increase welfare; in
contrast, if it leads to early stopping in a sequential sampling model subject to satisficing
(such that decision-makers might end up with a lower-value alternative), it could lead
to lower welfare (Benkert and Netzer, 2018). While it seems hard to make the case that
improving educational outcomes could make children or parents worse off, in other domains,
there might be no guarantee that behavior change triggered by informational interventions
actually improves welfare – a point conceptually made in Loewenstein et al. (2014) and
intimately connected to the ambiguity of the welfare effects of nudges pointed out by
Benkert and Netzer (2018). Additional research is needed to understand how salience
affects the underlying decision process and, ultimately, welfare in each case.
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Absences in a 3 week period
Parent's Answer
School transcripts
Note: This Figure displays the distribution of parents’ beliefs about their child’s attendance and recorded
attendance. Parents were asked at baseline to give their best estimate on how many times their child missed
math classes on a period of three weeks. Data was then crossed with administrative records. Four categories
were available for parents’ answers on attendance (missed 0; 1-2; 3-5; more than 5). Administrative data
registers data on attendance on a quarterly basis (period of ∼ 9 weeks) and was divided by 3 to validate
parents’ answers.
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Figure 2: Parents’ beliefs vs. actual student absenteeism (platform data)

























0 1 2 3





























0 1 2 3




Note: Non-parametric relationship between parents’ end-line beliefs about their child’s absences in math
classes and actual absences. At the end-line survey, parents were asked to provide their best estimate of
how many times their child missed math classes over the past quarter. Parents could pick an answer from
five categories (0 absences; 1-2; 3-5; 6-8; or more than 8). In this figure, we compute actual absences from
the data entered by teachers into the platform ’ since this is the data parents in the information group are
targeted with. Teachers reported information on each student’s attendance every 3 weeks, specifying how
many classes they missed over that interval (missed 0, 1-2; 3-5; 5 or more). Both panels show parents’
beliefs on the Y-axis, and the average of teachers’ reports over the 4th quarter on the X-axis. Panel
A plots a local polynomial regression for that relationship within the information group and the control
group. Panel B plots a local polynomial regression for that relationship within the salience group and the
control group. Both local polynomial regressions use a bandwidth of 0.6. We restrict the X-axis to the
[0,3] interval in both panels since very few observations are in the (3,4] range, rendering non-parametric
estimates infeasible.
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Figure 3: Distributional Effects
















p-value control-saliency=0.08; p-value saliency-info=0.94
Note: Effect of child-specific information and salience messages across the distribution of students’ math
standardized test scores for each treatment arm. Data used are from administrative records. The stan-
dardized test (Saresp) has a 400-point scale, where zero is the minimum score. P-values reported for
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the hypothesis that pairs of distributions are not statistically different.
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Figure 4: Are effects short-lived? Salience and information effects over time































Note: Panels A and B show the attendance and GPA averages for the pre- and post-intervention period,
for treatment and control groups. Attendance is recorded in percentage points (0-1 interval). GPA is in
a 0-10 scale (integer increments), with 5 as the passing grade. The intervention started at the beginning
of the third quarter (as shown by the vertical dashed line) and lasted until the end of the fourth quarter.
Attendance and GPA are available for each of the four quarters, as part of students’ transcripts. Braces
highlight the differences between the salience and pure control groups at each quarter, from a model
estimated with student controls, strata fixed effect and standard errors clustered at the classroom level, as
specified by equation 1. Student controls include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and
caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income and education. Coefficients for GPA are in
standard deviations, where GPA was normalized relative to the distribution of the comparison group (pure
control). Significance levels are denoted by * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Figure 5: Differences-in-differences coefficients of nudges, by quarter



































Note: Panels A and B show quarter-specific differences-in-differences estimates from equation 3 for the
nudge program by quarter, with the first quarter as the reference period. Math GPA was normalized
relative to the distribution of the comparison group (pure control). 90% confidence interval with standard
errors clustered at the classroom level.
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Figure 6: Parents’ beliefs vs. actual math GPA
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Note: Non-parametric relationship between parents’ end-line beliefs about their children’s GPA and actual
math GPA (Panels A and B) and that between changes in parents’ beliefs between baseline and end line
and changes in math GPA between the 2nd and 4th quarters (Panels C and D). At baseline, parents were
asked to provide their best estimate of their child’s first quarter math grade, choosing among four brackets:
0-4; 5-6; 7-8; or 9-10. At end line, parents were asked to provide their best estimate of their child’s 4th-
quarter math GPA, an integer between 0 and 10. We adjust end-line beliefs and actual math GPA’s to
the 4-point scale of baseline beliefs. The control group across all panels includes both within-class control
students and the pure control group. All local polynomial regressions use a 0.6 bandwidth.
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Figure 7: Effect sizes as a function of the number of nudges per week

































Note: Treatment effects of nudges to parents on attendance in math classes (Panel A) and math GPA
(Panel B), estimated through differences-in-differences, with the first quarter as reference period. The
sample includes sub-sample E and the pure control group. Effect sizes for different treatment intensities:
one, two or three nudges per week. GPA was normalized relative to the distribution of the comparison
group (pure control). Students’ controls include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and
caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income and education. All estimates are from OLS
regressions, with standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and balance
Sub-sample means ANOVA test Number ofp-value observations
Pure Control Salience Child-specific
Control within classroom information
Panel A: Student characteristics
Female 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.14 15589
Age 14.71 14.72 14.71 14.75 0.03 15595
Brown 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.48 15592
Black 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.45 15592
Portuguese GPA (0-10) 6.18 6.19 6.13 6.13 0.36 15437
Math GPA (0-10) 5.94 5.99 5.92 5.90 0.25 15453
Portuguese attendance 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.68 15480
Math attendance 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.30 15440
Panel B: Adult responsible for student
Mother 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.28 15597
Age 40.43 40.25 40.34 40.42 0.86 15461
Brown 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.65 15593
Black 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.80 15593
Middle school incomplete 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.66 15591
Middle school complete 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.17 15591
High School 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.13 15591
Earns less than 1 MW (∼ $250) 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.63 15593
Earns between 1 - 3 MW 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.41 15593
Note: Conditional means net of randomization strata fixed effects and p-values computed using randomization strata fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
at the classroom level. Variables are computed for four sub-samples. The table reports the following variables for students: age, gender, race and Portuguese
and math attendance and grades. The table also reports the following variables for primary caregivers: age, gender, race, education (indicator variables for
incomplete middle school, complete middle school, and high school), and income (indicator variables for less than one minimum wage, and between one and
three minimum wages). Data on students’ age, gender, attendance and GPA are from administrative records, and data on students’ race and on caregivers’
characteristics are from the face-to-face baseline survey, restricted to those who consented to participate in SMS program.
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Table 2: Selection at opt-in
Sub-sample mean Diff. Observations
Opt-out Opt-in
Female 0.45 0.50 0.05*** 23372
[ 0.01]
Age 14.92 14.73 -0.19*** 23398
[ 0.01]
Portuguese GPA (max 10) 5.39 6.16 0.77*** 22687
[ 0.03]
Math GPA (max 10) 5.09 5.94 0.84*** 22691
[ 0.03]
Portuguese attendance 0.88 0.91 0.04*** 22850
[ 0.00]
Math attendance 0.87 0.91 0.04*** 22753
[ 0.00]
Cash transfer beneficiary 0.19 0.16 -0.03*** 23029
[ 0.01]
Note: Differences in student characteristics between those whose primary caregivers con-
sented to participate in the SMS program and all others (refusals or those who could not
be reached by the school to ask for consent). Data from administrative records on stu-
dents’ age, gender, 1st-quarter math and Portuguese attendance and GPA, and whether
their household is a Bolsa-Família (Brazil’s flagship conditional cash transfer) beneficiary.
Column 3 reports differences in means between the two groups for each variable. * if
p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Table 3: Parents’ accuracy about attendance levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline beliefs End-line beliefs
Actual absences 0.211*** 0.186*** 0.271*** 0.267***
[0.025] [0.024] [0.043] [0.043]




Actual absences x Information -0.011 0.121**
[0.035] [0.057]
Actual absences x Salience -0.047 -0.055
[0.034] [0.058]
Observations 3,085 3,174 2,136 2,032
Classroom FE No No No No
Student-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.112 0.120 0.167 0.126
Note: Correlation between parents’ baseline and end-line beliefs about their children’s school
attendance and actual attendance within each period. At the baseline survey, parents were
asked to provide their best estimate of how many times their child had missed math classes
over the past three weeks, choosing among four brackets: 0 absences; 1-2; 3-5; or more than
5. Since administrative data on students’ 1st-quarter absences were only available for the
whole quarter (∼ 9 weeks), in columns (1) and (2) actual absences are computed by dividing
that indicator by 3. At the end-line survey, parents were asked to provide their best estimate
of how many times their child missed math classes over the past quarter, choosing among
five brackets: 0 absences; 1-2; 3-5; 6-8; or more than 8. We compute actual absences from
the data entered by teachers into the platform, since this is the data parents in the informa-
tion group are targeted with. Teachers reported on each student’s attendance every 3 weeks,
specifying how many classes they missed over that interval (missed 0, 1-2; 3-5; 5 or more). In
columns (3) and (4), actual absences are the average of teachers’ reports over the 4th quar-
ter. Columns (1) and (3) include only students in the child-specific information and control
groups (both within-class and pure control). Columns (2) and (4) include only students in
the salience and control groups (both within-class and pure control). Regressions include in-
dicator variables for students in the information and salience groups and an interaction term
between actual absences and the indicator for child-specific information (Columns 1 and 3)
or actual absences and the indicator for salience messages (Columns 2 and 4). Students’ con-
trols include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls in-
clude gender, age, race, family income and education. All columns are OLS regressions, with
standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Table 4: Effects on platform scores, within classroom
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Components
Summary measure Attendance Punctuality Homework
Child-specific information 0.0108 0.0115 0.000930 0.0199
[0.00953] [0.0126] [0.0123] [0.0131]
Salience 0.0189** 0.0312*** 0.00883 0.0163
[0.00895] [0.0118] [0.0117] [0.0122]
Linear time trend (weeks) 0.00703*** 0.0163*** -0.00386*** 0.0103***
[0.000472] [0.000742] [0.000708] [0.000679]
p-value diff. [Info] -[Salience] 0.408 0.125 0.536 0.784
Observations 158,018 53,453 52,389 52,176
Classroom FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.231 0.274 0.359 0.381
Note: Treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages on different students’ outcomes
recorded by the teachers. The sample includes students that opted-in the study and whose parents answered
the survey. Observations for students are stacked at the week-level. In columns (2) to (4), the dependent vari-
ables are: number of classes attended in the week (column 2), number classes attended on time (punctuality,
column 3), and the number of completed homeworks (column 4). Each of those variables are normalized rela-
tive to the distribution of the comparison group (pure control). In column 1, we calculate a summary measure
by averaging across the other three components, following Kling et al. (2007). Students’ controls include gen-
der, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income
and education. We also control for classroom fixed-effects and a linear weekly time trend. All columns are OLS
regressions, with standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
Table 5: Effects on attendance, grades and grade promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Math Promotion Math
Attendance GPA Rate Standardized
(p.p.) (std.) (p.p.) Test (std.)
Child-specific information 0.021*** 0.071** 0.026** 0.107**
[0.006] [0.032] [0.012] [0.047]
Salience 0.021*** 0.090*** 0.032*** 0.095**
[0.006] [0.032] [0.012] [0.047]
Control within classroom 0.018*** 0.070** 0.030** 0.085*
[0.006] [0.031] [0.012] [0.047]
Control mean 0.875 0.000 0.938 -0.000
p-value diff. [Info] -[Salience] 0.896 0.221 0.219 0.596
Observations 12,577 12,577 12,577 12,577
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.21 0.62 0.10 0.34
Note: Treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages on the following adminis-
trative outcomes: 4th-quarter attendance in math classes (Column 1); 4th-quarter math GPA (Col-
umn 2); grade promotion rate (=1 if the student advanced to high school, and 0 otherwise; Column 3),
and math standardized test scores (Column 4). GPA and standardized test were normalized relative
to the distribution of the pure control group. Students’ controls include gender, age, race, baseline
grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income and educa-
tion. We also control for randomization strata fixed-effects. All columns are OLS regressions, with










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Effects of framing child-specific information relatively to the classroom median
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Math Promotion Math
Attendance GPA Rate Standardized
(p.p.) (std.) (p.p.) Test (std.)
Child-specific information 0.021*** 0.069** 0.029** 0.097**
[0.006] [0.032] [0.012] [0.047]
Relative information 0.022*** 0.078* 0.017 0.141**
[0.007] [0.041] [0.014] [0.058]
Salience 0.021*** 0.090*** 0.032*** 0.095**
[0.006] [0.032] [0.012] [0.047]
Control mean 0.875 0.000 0.938 -0.000
p-value diff. [Rel. info] -[Salience] 0.770 0.690 0.086 0.252
Observations 12577 12577 12577 12577
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table displays treatment effects of child-specific information, child-specific relative information,
and salience messages on the following administrative outcomes: 4th-quarter attendance in math classes
(Column 1); 4th-quarter math GPA (Column 2); grade promotion rate (=1 if the student advanced to high
school, and 0 otherwise; Column 3), and math standardized test scores (Column 4). Parents in the relative
information treatment receive not only child-specific information but comparisons of their children to other
students in their class. GPA and standardized test scores were normalized relative to the distribution of the
pure control group. Students’ controls include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and care-
givers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income and education. We also control for randomization
strata fixed-effects, and include an indicator variable for the within-classroom control group. All columns
are OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and ***
if p<0.01.
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Table 8: Differential effects of salience in sub-sample without informational intervention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Math Promotion Math
Attendance GPA Rate Standardized
(p.p.) (std.) (p.p.) Test (std.)
Panel A: Full sample
Child-specific information 0.021*** 0.070** 0.026** 0.108**
[0.006] [0.032] [0.012] [0.047]
Salience 0.017*** 0.070** 0.027** 0.101**
[0.006] [0.033] [0.012] [0.048]
Salience x No-information sub-sample 0.001 0.049* 0.004 0.015
[0.004] [0.029] [0.009] [0.042]
Observations 12577 12577 12577 12577
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Sample B and D
Salience x No-information sub-sample 0.034*** 0.172*** 0.059*** 0.106*
[0.006] [0.042] [0.012] [0.056]
Observations 3760 3541 3675 3455
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Treatment effects of salience messages separately for schools where some parents were assigned to child-
specific information, and those where none was. Panel A estimates differential treatment effects of salience mes-
sages within the no-information sub-sample through an interaction term, and Panel B estimates treatment effects
of salience messages restricting attention to that sub-sample and the pure control group. Treatment effects on
4th-quarter attendance in math classes (Column 1); 4th-quarter math GPA (Column 2); grade promotion rate
(=1 if the student advanced to high school, and 0 otherwise; Column 3), and math standardized test scores (Col-
umn 4). GPA was normalized relative to the distribution of the pure control group. Students’ controls include
gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and their caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family
income and education. We also control for randomization strata fixed-effects, and include an indicator variable
for the within-classroom control group. All columns are OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the
classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Table 9: Treatment effects of nudges: Differences-in-differences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All quarters Placebo (first 2 quarters)
Math Math Math Math
Attendance GPA Attendance GPA
(p.p.) (std.) (p.p.) (std.)
Nudges x Post 0.0151*** 0.116*** 0.00842 0.0312
[0.00591] [0.0427] [0.00735] [0.0600]
Nudges 0.00621 -0.162*** 0.00130 -0.180***
[0.00604] [0.0610] [0.00635] [0.0673]
Post -0.0333*** 0.00420 -0.0389*** -0.0206
[0.00416] [0.0252] [0.00499] [0.0388]
Observations 14,775 14,586 7,347 7,376
Student-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.072 0.060 0.074 0.062
Note: Treatment effects of nudge messages to parents that do not require any input from
teachers on: 4th-quarter attendance in math classes (Columns 1 and 3) and 4th-quarter math
GPA (Columns 2 and 4). GPA was normalized relative to the distribution of the pure con-
trol group. The sample includes sub-sample E and the pure control group. We also excluded
parents assigned to 2 or 3 nudges per week. Observations are stacked at the quarter-level.
In Columns (1) and (2), we estimate treatment effects using all four available quarters. In
Columns (3) and (4), we estimate placebos using only the first two available quarters. All es-
timates use the first quarter as period of reference. Regressions include interactions between
a post-treatment time dummy and treated students, and between the post-treatment dummy
and within-classroom control group dummy (the pure control is the reference group). We
also include in the regression indicator variables for the post-treatment period and for the
treatment and within-classroom control groups, and student-level controls. Students’ con-
trols include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls in-
clude gender, age, race, family income and education. All columns are OLS regressions, with
standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Table 10: Effects on parental engagement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Academic Motivation Dialogue Aspirations
activities
Child-specific information 0.092* 0.075* 0.147*** 0.092**
[0.051] [0.042] [0.044] [0.036]
Salience 0.064 0.096** 0.122*** 0.095***
[0.050] [0.041] [0.043] [0.036]
p-value diff. [Info] -[Salience] 0.263 0.382 0.374 0.891
Observations 9539 9539 9539 9539
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages on parental engagement.
Variables are based on students’ end-line survey. They were asked to state how often their parents
engage in certain activities (never, almost never, sometimes, almost always, always). Out of the 12
questions, factor analysis was performed to create 3 variables of parental behavior: academic activ-
ities (help with homework, help to organize school material, participate in school-parent meetings,
talk to the teachers); motivation (incentivize to not miss school, to not be late, to study and to
read); dialogue (ask about homework, ask about grades, ask about day in school and classes). We
also created a dummy variable for parents’ aspirations that indicates whether students answered
that their parents expect them to go to college or not. Variables were normalized relative to the
distribution of the comparison group (pure control). Students’ controls include gender, age, race,
baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income
and education. We also control for randomization strata fixed-effects, and include an indicator
variable for the within-classroom control group. All columns are OLS regressions, with standard
errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Child-specific information 0.151*** 0.116* -0.108**
[0.051] [0.065] [0.054]
Salience 0.123** 0.113* -0.110**
[0.050] [0.060] [0.052]
p-value diff. [Info] -[Salience] 0.344 0.946 0.933
Observations 9539 9539 9539
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes Yes
Note: Treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages on
students’ time-use. Variables are based on the end-line survey. Students were
requested to answer how many hours per day (0, 15 minutes, 30 minutes, 1
hour, 2 hours, more than 2 hours) they spend in each of the following activi-
ties: i. studying at home on weekdays; ii. studying at home on weekends; iii.
studying at home the day before a test; iv. reading a book; v. reading the
newspaper; vi. reading magazines; vii. watching TV; viii. navigating on the
internet or social media; and ix. helping with housework. Factor analysis was
performed to create three variables of student behavior: academic activities
(items i, ii and iii); reading activities (items iv, v and vi) and other activities
(items vii, viii and ix). Variables were normalized relative to the distribution
of the comparison group (pure control). Students’ controls include gender, age,
race, baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender,
age, race, family income and education. We also control for randomization
strata fixed-effects, and include an indicator variable for the within-classroom
control group. All columns are OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered
at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Table 12: Parents’ accuracy about math GPA levels and changes
Baseline beliefs End-line beliefs Change in beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Actual GPA -0.050 -0.017 0.265*** 0.253***
[0.048] [0.051] [0.030] [0.039]
Changes in actual GPA 0.156*** 0.157***
[0.036] [0.039]
Child-specific information 0.051 -0.055 0.052
[0.085] [0.104] [0.044]
Salience 0.031 0.014 0.008
[0.080] [0.091] [0.043]
Actual GPA x Information -0.011 0.020
[0.032] [0.037]
Actual GPA x Salience -0.013 -0.018
[0.030] [0.036]
Changes in actual GPA x Information 0.104***
[0.052]
Changes in actual GPA x Salience 0.073
[0.054]
Baseline level -1.216*** -1.195***
[0.025] [0.025]
Observations 2,815 2,878 2,296 2,178 1,160 1,140
Classroom FE No No No No No No
Student-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.152 0.154 0.248 0.242 0.790 0.783
Note: Correlation between parents’ baseline and end-line beliefs about their children’s math grades and actual grades as
well as the correlation between changes in beliefs and math grades within each period. At baseline, parents were asked to
provide their best estimate of their child’s first quarter math grade, choosing among four brackets: 0-4; 5-6; 7-8; or 9-10.
At end line, parents were asked to provide their best estimate of their child’s 4th-quarter math GPA, an integer between 0
and 10. We build a 4-point scale variable for end-line beliefs consistent with the baseline variable. The dependent variables
are: an ordinal scale of parents’ baseline beliefs, between 1 (corresponding to the 0-4 bracket) to 4 (corresponding to the
9-10 bracket) (Columns 1 and 2); a 4-point scale equivalent variable for end-line beliefs (Columns 3 and 4); and the change
in beliefs between the two periods (Columns 5 and 6). Columns (1), (3) and (5) include only students in the child-specific
information and control groups (both within-class and pure control). Columns (2), (4) and (6) include only students in the
salience and control groups (both within-class and pure control). Regressions include indicator variables for students in the
information and salience groups and an interaction term between (changes in) actual math GPA and the indicator for child-
specific information (levels in columns 1 and 3, and changes in column 5) or (changes in) actual math GPA and the indicator
for salience messages (levels in columns 2 and 4, and changes in column 6). 2nd-quarter math GPA included as control in
columns (5) and (6). Students’ controls include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls
include gender, age, race, family income and education. All columns are OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at
the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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(p.p.) (std.) Test (std.)
Child-specific information 0.007 0.053 0.047
[0.005] [0.036] [0.043]
Salience 0.007 0.066* 0.032
[0.005] [0.036] [0.043]
Observations 12577 12577 12577
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes Yes
Note: Treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages on the
parents’ accuracy and students’ educational outcomes in Portuguese classes. Depen-
dent variables are 4th-quarter Portuguese attendance (Column 1), Portuguese GPA
(Column 2), and Portuguese standardized test scores (Column 3). GPA and stan-
dardized test scores were normalized relative to the distribution of the pure control
group. Students’ controls include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance,
and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income and education. We
also control for randomization strata fixed-effects, and include an indicator variable
for the within-classroom control group. All columns are OLS regressions, with stan-
dard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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A [Supplementary Appendix] Additional details on SMS con-
tent
As described in section 3.3, math teachers from treatment schools were oriented to fill in
the platform every week with that week’s dimension of students’ behavior: attendance, tar-
diness or assignment completion, as shown in the table below. Teachers filled information
regarding student behavior on each dimension considering the past three weeks.
Attendance Tardiness Assignment Completion
1. Missed more than 5 classes 1. Was late for more than 5 classes 1. Did not complete any of the assignments
2. Missed 3 to 5 classes 2. Was late 3 to 5 classes 2. Completed less than half of the assignments
3. Missed less than 3 classes 3. Was late for less than 3 classes 3. Completed more than half of the assignments
4. Did not miss any class 4. Was not late for any class 4. Completed all the assignments
The table below shows the text messages sent in each of the 18 weeks, for each treatment
arm (individual information, relative information and salience). The core text for the
individual information and relative information messages were the same for each week, with
only the frequency filled by the teacher in the platform and the median for the class varying
(denominated by @info and @info_class in the table). For the relative information arm,
the platform computes the class median once the teacher submits all students’ information
every week. The salience messages were different each week. The messages for all the 3
groups were personalized with students names (@name).
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Week Individual Info. Relative Info. Salience
Week 1 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
If missing a class, @name can miss
important parts of the content taught,
which could impair his/her performance
at school.
Week 2 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
When students are late for class, they can
impair the progress of the group and dis-
turb their peers’ concentration. It is im-
portant that @name arrives on time for
classes.
Week 3 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
It is important for @name to always turn
in assignments, as they allow the student
to reinforce the content taught in the class-
room.
Week 4 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
Learning requires constant participation.
It is important that @name is always
present in class.
Week 5 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
For a good learning experience, it is im-
portant that @name is always punctual,
so he/she doesn’t miss important content
taught in class.
Week 6 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
@Name could fall behind if he/she does
not turn in the homework, because the
teacher may not be able to help him/her
with his/her specific difficulties.
Week 7 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
Participate in @name’s education. Family
engagement is essential for the student to
attend classes daily.
Week 8 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
It is important that @name is always
punctual for class so that the teacher can
complete the lesson plan successfully.
Week 9 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
If @name does not turn in homework as-
signments, it may hurt his/her learning,
as the content taught in class will not be
reinforced.
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Week Individual Info. Relative Info. Salience
Week 10 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
If he/she misses classes, @name may miss
important parts of the content, impairing
his/her school performance.
Week 11 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
Arriving late impairs the progress of the
class and the concentration of @name’s
peers. It’s important @name is punctual.
Week 12 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
It is important for @name to always turn
in assignments, as they allow the student
to reinforce the content taught in class.
Week 13 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
Learning requires constant participation,
so it’s important that @name is always
present in class.
Week 14 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
For good learning, it is essential that
@name is always punctual so he/she does
not miss important content taught in class.
Week 15 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
The teacher might not be able to help
@name in his/her specific challenges if
he/she does not turn in his/her home-
work.
Week 16 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
Engage in @name’s education. Family in-
volvement is essential for the student to
attend classes daily.
Week 17 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
It is important that @name is always on
time so that the teacher can carry out the
lesson successfully.
Week 18 According to the information
recorded by the teacher in the
system, @name @info in the
past 3 weeks.
In the past 3 weeks, @name
@info. In his/her class, most
of the students @info_class.
If @name does not turn in the school
assignments, it may be detrimental to
his/her learning, as the content taught in
class will not be reinforced.
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The figure below shows two examples of the SMS sequence sent to parents assigned
to the nudge program (described in section 5.5.2). The figure displays a stylized sequence
for a parent assigned to 3 messages a week and interactivity. Those assigned to the group
without interactivity do not receive the feedback message on day 4 of every week. Those
assigned to 2 messages a week do not receive the growth message on day 5 of every week.
Last, those assigned to 1 message a week receive only the activity message, on day 3
of every week. Only parents who received one message per week were considered in the
robustness tests performed in section 5.5.2 48.
Day 1: Motivating fact Day 3: Activity Day 4: Feedback Day 5: Growth 
Does your child miss 
school often? 
School is part of his/
her commitment, so 
encourage him/her 
to always attend 
classes.  
Ask your child what 
he/she does not like 
in school. Try to 
understand what he/
she thinks about 
missing classes and 
the consequences of 
being absent. 
Did you do it? 
Follow your child's 
school attendance 
and talk to him/her 
about responsibility. 
Evaluate together 
when there is a real 
need to be absent. 
Day 1: Motivating fact Day 3: Activity Day 4: Feedback Day 5: Growth 
Mathematics 
develops the ability to 
solve problems and 
overcome challenges. 
Therefore, it is 
important that your 
child strives to learn 
math. 
Ask your child 
whether or not he/
she likes math and 
why. Talk about the 
day-to-day situations 
in which we might 
need to use math. 
Did you do it? 
Encourage your 
child to study math. 
A good site to learn 




48The intellectual property rights of the content library of engagement messages belongs to our imple-
menting partner, MGov Brasil, and therefore only two examples are provided here.
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B [Supplementary Appendix] Additional balance and selec-
tive attrition tests
In this section, we present balance and attrition tests. Table B.1 shows descriptive statis-
tics and balance test for the main sample used in the analysis (e.g. Tables 5, 7, 8). Table
B.2 presents descriptive statistics and balance test for the theory of change sample. Next,
Tables B.3 and B.4 contain a selective attrition analysis for completing the surveys by
treatment status and by baseline characteristics, respectively. Because parents who opted
into the program had different characteristics from those who did not opt in (as we showed
in Table 2), in Table B.5 we show results for school transcripts and test scores re-weighting
observations by the inverse probability of opting into the program. Finally, Table B.6
describes statistics and balance for the theory-based nudging program for the parents re-
ceiving one message per week, which is the sample used to run the differences-in-differences
analysis described in section 5.
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Table B.1: Descriptive statistics and balance tests for the whole sample
Means Diff=0 Samplep-value Size
Pure Control Salience InfoControl Within Class
Student characteristics
Female 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.03 12577
Age 14.69 14.67 14.67 14.71 0.03 12577
Brown 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.14 12577
Black 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.79 12577
Portuguese GPA (max 10) 6.39 6.31 6.27 6.28 0.69 12577
Math GPA (max 10) 6.10 6.11 6.05 6.06 0.57 12577
Portuguese attendance 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.50 12577
Math attendance 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.39 12577
Adult responsible for student
Mother 0.77 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.45 12577
Age 40.39 40.28 40.34 40.57 0.68 12577
Brown 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.15 12577
Black 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.71 12577
Middle school incomplete 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 12577
Middle school complete 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.48 12577
High School 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.19 12577
Earns less than 1 MW (1MW ∼ $250) 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.80 12577
Earns between 1 - 3 MW 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.80 12577
Note: This Table displays conditional means net of randomization strata fixed effects and p-values computed using random-
ization strata fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the classroom level. Variables are computed for four sub-samples.
The Table reports the following variables for students: dummies for females, brown and black students, and Portuguese and
Math attendance and grades. The following variables are reported for the adults responsible for the students: age and dum-
mies for mothers, race variables (black and brown), education variables (incomplete middle school, complete middle school,
and high school), and income variables (less than one minimum wage or between one and three minimum wages). Data on
students’ gender, age, GPA and attendance are from administrative records, and data on students’ race and on caregivers’
characteristics are from the face-to-face baseline survey within those who opted-in to participate in program.
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Table B.2: Descriptive statistics and balance tests for the sub-samples with answers to the
phone surveys
Means Diff=0 Samplep-value Size
Pure Control Salience InfoControl Within Class
Student characteristics
Female 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.18 9539
Age 14.65 14.65 14.66 14.68 0.24 9539
Brown 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.33 9539
Black 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.68 9539
Portuguese GPA (max 10) 6.51 6.45 6.39 6.39 0.51 9539
Math GPA (max 10) 6.21 6.22 6.20 6.17 0.87 9539
Portuguese attendance 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.30 9539
Math attendance 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.45 9539
Adult responsible for student
Mother 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.43 9539
Age 40.62 40.39 40.34 40.74 0.64 9539
Brown 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.27 9539
Black 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.67 9539
Middle school incomplete 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.44 9539
Middle school complete 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.37 9539
High School 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.42 9539
Earns less than 1 MW (1MW ∼ $250) 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.86 9539
Earns between 1 - 3 MW 0.44 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.92 9539
Note: This Table displays conditional means net of randomization strata fixed effects and p-values computed using random-
ization strata fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the classroom level. Variables are computed for four sub-samples.
The Table reports the following variables for students: dummies for females, brown and black students, and Portuguese and
Math attendance and grades. The following variables are reported for the adults responsible for the students: age and dum-
mies for mothers, race variables (black and brown), education variables (incomplete middle school, complete middle school,
and high school), and income variables (less than one minimum wage or between one and three minimum wages). Data on
students’ gender, age, GPA and attendance are from administrative records, and data on students’ race and on caregivers’
characteristics are from the face-to-face baseline survey within those who opted-in to participate in program.
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Table B.3: Selective non-response tests
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Endline Endline
Survey - Survey - Survey -
Parents Parents Students
Salience -0.016 0.022 0.016
[0.020] [0.024] [0.016]
Information -0.008 0.039 0.013
[0.021] [0.024] [0.016]
P-value Salience=Info=Control Within 0.828 0.412 0.694
Sample Size 4862 4653 15597
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: The Table displays selective non-response tests for each survey. The pure control
group is the omitted category. In all columns, the dependent variable is an indicator vari-
able equal to 1 if parents/students completed the survey, and 0 otherwise. Students’ con-
trols include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls
include gender, age, race, family income and education. We also control for randomiza-
tion strata fixed-effects. All columns are OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered
at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
68
Table B.4: Marginal probability of completing the survey
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Endline Endline
Survey - Survey - Survey -
Parents Parents Students
Student characteristics
Female 0.006 -0.010 0.015
[0.012] [0.013] [0.007]
Age -0.017* -0.027* -0.055*
[0.009] [0.009] [0.006]
Brown or Black -0.041*** -0.012*** -0.025***
[0.012] [0.013] [0.007]
Math GPA (max 10) 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.027***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Math attendance 0.147** 0.213** 0.774**
[0.067] [0.070] [0.045]
Adult responsible for student
Mother 0.007 0.057 -0.006
[0.015] [0.017] [0.008]
Age -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.001***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
Brown or Black -0.052*** -0.010*** -0.012***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.007]
Low Education (middle school incomplete) -0.070*** -0.059*** -0.042***
[0.014] [0.015] [0.008]
Cash transfer beneficiary -0.032** -0.039** -0.029**
[0.016] [0.018] [0.010]
Note: The Table displays the correlation of filling-in parents baseline and endline survey as well
as students’ endline survey. The dependent variable in all Columns is a dummy indicating if the
respective survey is completed. Surveys were considered completed if at least 11 questions were
answered. Students’ controls include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and care-
givers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income, education , and a dummy indicating
whether the family is a Bolsa-Família (Brazil’s flagship conditional cash transfer) recipient. We
also control for randomization strata fixed-effects. All columns are OLS regressions, with stan-
dard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Table B.5: School transcripts and standardized tests - re-weighting by the probability of
opting-in the program
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Math Promotion Math
Attendance GPA Rate Standardized
(p.p.) (std.) (p.p.) Test (std.)
Salience 0.022*** 0.100*** 0.038*** 0.096**
[0.006] [0.032] [0.013] [0.046]
Information 0.022*** 0.077** 0.031** 0.105**
[0.007] [0.032] [0.013] [0.046]
Control Mean 0.875 0.000 0.938 -0.000
P-value diff. [Info] -[Salience] 0.854 0.141 0.162 0.680
Sample Size 12550 12550 12550 12550
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The Table displays treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages on the
following administrative outcomes: 4th-quarter attendance in math classes (Column 1); 4th-quarter
math GPA (Column 2); grade promotion rate (=1 if the student advanced to high school, and 0 oth-
erwise; Column 3), and math standardized test scores (Column 4). GPA and standardized test scores
were normalized relative to the distribution of the pure control group. Observations were re-weighted
by the probability of opting-in the program. Students’ controls include gender, age, race, baseline
grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income and educa-
tion. We also control for randomization strata fixed-effects. All columns are OLS regressions, with
standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Table B.6: Balance tests for the nudge intervention
Means Diff=0 Samplep-value Size
Pure Control EngagementControl Within Class
Panel A: Student characteristics
Female 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.23 3058
Age 14.68 14.66 14.69 0.68 3058
Brown 0.36 0.32 0.31 0.05 3058
Black 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.53 3058
Portuguese GPA (max 10) 6.37 5.99 5.99 0.00 3019
Math GPA (max 10) 6.07 5.79 5.75 0.00 3021
Portuguese attendance 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.91 3037
Math attendance 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.88 2975
Panel B: Adult responsible for student
Mother 0.78 0.76 0.74 0.14 3058
Age 40.38 40.77 40.47 0.51 3008
Black 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.88 3058
Middle school incomplete 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.06 3058
Middle school complete 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.03 3058
High School 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.85 3058
Earns less than 1 MW (1MW ∼ $250) 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.10 3058
Earns between 1 - 3 MW 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.11 3058
Note: This Table displays conditional means net of randomization strata fixed effects and p-values of differences between out-
comes in sub-sample E and the pure control group computed using randomization strata fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
at the classroom level. The Table reports the following variables for students: dummies for females, brown and black stu-
dents, and Portuguese and Math attendance and grades. The following variables are reported for the adults responsible for the
students: age and dummies for mothers, race variables (black and brown), education variables (incomplete middle school, com-
plete middle school, and high school), and income variables (less than one minimum wage or between one and three minimum
wages). Data on students’ gender, age, GPA and attendance are from administrative records, and data on students’ race and
on caregivers’ characteristics are from the face-to-face baseline survey within those who opted-in to participate in program.
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C [Supplementary Appendix] Manipulation checks
If teachers did not fill in the platform with students’ information weekly, or if parents did
not even acknowledge receiving text messages from the school, then there would be no hope
that our experiment could allow us detecting the effects of interest. For this reason, this
Appendix looks at these manipulation checks. Figure C.1 displays statistics for platform
usage and receipt of text messages across treatment arms.
Figure C.1: Manipulation Tests
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Panel C: Did students know their parents









Note: The Figure displays group averages across groups. The dependent variables are: fraction of weeks
that teachers filled-in the platform (Panel A), fraction of parents that acknowledged receiving messages
(Panel B), and fraction of students that knew their parents were receiving messages (Panel C). The
Figure also displays 90% confidence interval. All panels show the average difference between groups. This
difference between categories was estimated through a simple regression. Significance levels are denoted
by * if p<0.1, ** if p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
Over the course of the 18 weeks, 66% of teachers inputted students’ information through
the platform in a typical week. Since this figure was slightly lower for sub-samples A and
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C relative to sub-sample D, students assigned to the information treatment are associated
with a 2 p.p. lower messaging rate. In Supplementary Appendix E, we show that our
results are robust to selection on unobservable variables by dropping observations from
classrooms with the highest and lowest response rates, such as to equalize the rate at
which teachers filled in the platform over the course of the 18 weeks across sub-samples
(analogously to the bounding procedure in Lee, 2009).
At the end line surveys, we asked parents whether they had received text messages
from the school, and asked students whether they knew their parents were getting such
text messages. While 46% of parents in the control group acknowledge receipt of text
messages (principals could send up to two notifications a month about school events to all
parents, even in the pure control group), that figure is 90% across treatment groups – close
to the expected 100%, and statistically different from the control group. Meanwhile, 74%
of students across treatment arms acknowledged their parents received text messages from
the school, as opposed to 40% in the control group. Since over 50% of parents reported a
different mobile phone number for their child at the enrollment form, this is not just an
artifact of parents and children sharing the same handset; rather, it hints at communication
between parents and children as a result of the text messages.
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D [Supplementary Appendix] Beliefs vs. actual scorecard
attendance
We have two available measures of students’ math attendance: actual absences reported
by teachers through the platform and 4th-quarter report cards. In Table 3, we showed that
the information intervention significantly increased parents’ accuracy about their child’s
attendance. Now, in this section of the Appendix, we document the correlation between
parents’ beliefs and scorecard attendance.
We asked parents to guess their children’s attendance over the 4th quarter (rather
than over the previous 3 weeks, as we had done at baseline) because we wanted to compare
their guess to actual student attendance included in children’s report cards. Different from
Dizon-Ross (2019), however, 4th-quarter report cards had still not been made available to
parents at the time of our survey. This Appendix shows that, without report cards in hand,
parents targeted with high-frequency information on their children’s absences became no
more accurate than control parents about their children’s cumulative absences over that
period. Conversely, the analysis in the main text contrasts parents’ estimates at end line to
students’ average absences reported by teachers through the platform over the 4th quarter
– matching the typical content communicated to treated parents over SMS, rather than
requiring them to recall and sum over their full history of absenteeism data.
At the baseline survey, parents were asked to provide their best estimate of how many
times their child had missed math classes over the past three weeks from four categories
(0 absences; 1-2; 3-5; or more than 5). Thus, a comparison between beliefs and scorecard
attendance requires the total number of scorecard absences. However, only the fraction of
absences was registered in students’ scorecards. Since the total number of classes varies
from one class to another (and was also not recorded), it is not immediate how to recover
the absolute number of missed classes.
We propose a simple algorithm to recover the outcome of interest. It is based on the
facts that absences are integer numbers, and that the total number of classes is the same
for all students within each class.
Let asc be the number of absences for students s in class c and Nc. We observe the
fraction of absences fsc. Apart from slight rounding differences, we expect that fsc ∗Nc ∈
Z+. Therefore, we can simulate values of Nc and, for each of them, calculate the distance





[∣∣∣∣fsc ∗Nc − nint(fsc ∗Nc)∣∣∣∣]
where |.| is the absolute value function and nint(.) is the nearest integer function. Having
found the total number of classes, we can directly calculate the number of absences asc for
each student.
We test this algorithm with 3rd-quarter attendance (where we have both the number of
absolute absences and the fraction of absences). We are able to recover the correct number
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of absences for over 95% of students.
We can see in Table D.1 that neither the information or salience treatments increase
the accuracy of parents’ beliefs about 4th-quarter scorecard attendance – which had still
not been made available to parents at the time of the end-line survey. Both estimates are
very close to zero and statistically insignificant.
Table D.1: Parents’ accuracy about scorecard attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline beliefs End-line beliefs
Actual absences 0.211*** 0.186*** 0.150*** 0.152***
[0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023]




Actual absences x Information -0.011 0.002
[0.032] [0.057]
Actual absences x Salience -0.047 0.012
[0.034] [0.034]
Observations 3,085 3,174 2,967 2,862
Classroom FE No No No No
Student-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.112 0.120 0.109 0.112
Note: Correlation between parents’ baseline and end-line beliefs about their children’s school
attendance and actual attendance. At the baseline survey, parents were asked to provide
their best estimate of how many times their child had missed math classes over the past three
weeks. Parents could pick one answer from four categories (0 absences; 1-2; 3-5; or more
than 5). Scorecard attendance was computed according to the algorithm described in this
Appendix. Regressions include either an indicator variable for child-specific information and
its interaction with actual absences (Columns 1 and 3) or an indicator variable for salience
messages and its interaction with actual absences (Columns 2 and 4). Students’ controls
include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include
gender, age, race, family income and education. All columns are OLS regressions, with stan-
dard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Figure D.1: Parents’ accuracy gap wrt their child’s baseline math attendance and math
GPA
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Note: Panel A displays the difference between parents’ guesses and baseline student attendance in math
classes, and in Panel B, that between parents’ guesses and baseline student math GPA. A value of 0
indicates that parents were accurate; positive values indicate that they were pessimistic; and negative
values, that they were optimistic relative to the ground truth.
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E [Supplementary Appendix] Bounding treatment effects
As shown in Figure E.1, the average number of times teachers filled in the platform over
the course of 18 weeks was not statistically identical across all sub-samples. To test if ours
results are sensitive to selective non-response, we trim observations (along the lines of Lee,
2009), respecting the cluster structure of the data: we drop classrooms until we equalize
the average number of times teachers filled in the platform across sub-samples.
We do so by dropping 7 classrooms from schools from sub-sample D (where students
were assigned to either salience or control), for which teachers had filled in the platform
each and every week (over 18 weeks), and 27 classrooms from sub-sample C (where 25% of
students were assigned to salience, 25% to child-specific information, 25% to information
framed relatively to the classroom median, and 25% to control), for which teachers filled in
the platform 3 times or less over the course of 18 weeks. This procedure maximizes sample
size while eliminating selective non-response; in this new sample, the average number of
times teachers fill the platform is statistically identical across sub-samples.
We then replicate our main results on school transcripts and test score (showed in Table
5) as well as the analyses testing if there is interaction between salience and information
(showed in Table 8). Results are showed in tables E.1 and E.2.
























Note: The Figure displays average number of times teachers filled the platform by sub-sample during the
18-weeks period across samples. The Figure also displays 90% confidence interval. We show the p-value
for the joint test that averages are equal across samples A, C and D. Significance levels are denoted by *
if p<0.1, ** if p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Table E.1: Robustness: Administrative educational outcomes (equalizing SMS received by
sub-sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Math Promotion Math
Attendance GPA Rate Standardized
(p.p.) (std.) (p.p.) Test (std.)
Salience 0.019*** 0.085*** 0.030*** 0.108**
[0.006] [0.032] [0.011] [0.045]
Information 0.019*** 0.070** 0.026** 0.110**
[0.006] [0.032] [0.011] [0.046]
Control Mean 0.875 0.000 0.938 -0.000
P-value diff. [Info] -[Salience] 0.994 0.368 0.323 0.929
Sample Size 11951 11951 11951 11951
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The Table displays treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages on the
following administrative outcomes: 4th-quarter attendance in math classes (Column 1); 4th-quarter
math GPA (Column 2); grade promotion rate (=1 if the student advanced to high school, and 0 oth-
erwise; Column 3), and math standardized test scores (Column 4). To equalize the number of SMS
received, 7 classrooms from the salience-only sample were excluded, where teachers had filled the plat-
form all the 18 weeks; and 27 classrooms from the sub-sample containing all treatments (25% salience,
25% ind. info; 25% relative info, 25% control), where teacher participation was low (teachers filled
3 times or less the platform) were also excluded. GPA and standardized test scores were normalized
relative to the distribution of the pure control group. Students’ controls include gender, age, race,
baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income and
education. We also control for randomization strata fixed-effects, and include an indicator variable for
the within-classroom control group. All columns are OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered
at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Table E.2: Interactions with information? (equalizing SMS received by sub-sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Math Promotion Math
Attendance GPA Rate Standardized
(p.p.) (std.) (p.p.) Test (std.)
Salience 0.016** 0.068** 0.027** 0.110**
[0.006] [0.033] [0.011] [0.047]
Information 0.019*** 0.070** 0.026** 0.110**
[0.006] [0.032] [0.011] [0.046]
Salience Only 0.002 0.030 0.002 -0.004
[0.004] [0.029] [0.009] [0.044]
Sample Size 11951 11951 11951 11951
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The Table displays treatment effects of child-specific information, salience messages, and
an interaction between treatments on the following administrative outcomes: 4th-quarter atten-
dance in math classes (Column 1); 4th-quarter math GPA (Column 2); grade promotion rate
(=1 if the student advanced to high school, and 0 otherwise; Column 3), and math standard-
ized test scores (Column 4). To equalize the number of SMS received, 7 classrooms from the
salience-only sample were excluded, where teachers had filled the platform all the 18 weeks; and
27 classrooms from the sub-sample containing all treatments (25% salience, 25% ind. info; 25%
relative info, 25% control), where teacher participation was low (teachers filled 3 times or less
the platform) were also excluded. GPA and standardized test scores were normalized relative to
the distribution of the pure control group. Students’ controls include gender, age, race, baseline
grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income and ed-
ucation. We also control for randomization strata fixed-effects. All columns are OLS regressions,
with standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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F [Supplementary Appendix] Additional results on heteroge-
neous treatment effects by platform scores
As described in section 3, a web-platform was created specifically such that teachers could
provide timely information about their students’ behavior. Math teachers at treated schools
were oriented to fill in the platform every week with that week’s dimension of students’
behavior: attendance, tardiness or homework completion, over the course of 18 weeks.
Teachers were to fill in information with respect to each dimension of students’ behavior
accounting for the past three weeks49. The system required teachers to fill in information
for all their students.
This appendix presents the results for treatment effects on the outcomes recorded
weekly by teachers on the online platform. Because teachers did not fill in any content for
pure control schools, the estimates are relative to the control group within classroom.
Each week, teachers evaluated students using a 4 point scale, where 1 was the minimum
and 4 was the maximum. For this analysis, we reverse-coded scores for tardiness, to
normalize estimates across dimensions such that a positive coefficient always means a
positive outcome. We estimate the following model:
Yi,c,s = α+ β1Saliencei,c,s + β2Infoi,c,s +
∑
γkXk,i,c,s + θs + εi,c,s
where Yi,c,s denotes the weekly score of each dimension for student i in classroom c of
stratum s, the within-class control stand for the reference category (omitted indicator
variable), Xk,i,c,s is a matrix of student’s characteristics, θs are randomization stratum
FE, and εi,c,s is an error term, clustered at the classroom level.
We start by plotting coefficients week-by-week in Figure F.1. As behaviors rotate
weekly, we can plot coefficients in 3-week intervals.
49Students are scheduled to have 6 Math classes per week.
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Figure F.1: Weekly platform scores, by treatment arm
































Note: This Figure reports weekly platform scores, by treatment arm, for three administrative dependent
variables: attendance in math classes (Panel A); punctuality (Panel B) and homework completion (Panel
C). Estimates include dummies for receiving child-specific information and salience messages. Students’
controls include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender,
age, race, family income and education. We also control for classroom fixed-effects. All columns are OLS
regressions, with standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Despite the large spillovers within classrooms that we document in the main text, we can
see that the curves for salience and information interventions drift clearly above the control
one, particularly so for punctuality and homework completion. For those two dimensions
of behavior, the difference between the treatment arms (information and salience) and the
control group clearly did not exist the first time teachers filled in the platform, and then
gradually increased over time.
Last, we analyze heterogeneity in treatment effects with respect to attendance, punc-
tuality and homework completion scores entered into the platform by teachers.
Table F.1: Heterogeneous treatment effects by average platform scores (attendance)
Reported attendance
Math Math Math standardized Grade
attendance GPA test score promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Child-specific information 0.00465 -0.00219 0.0135 -0.0335
[0.0163] [0.165] [0.0844] [0.0296]
Child-specific information x average reported -0.00125 0.0142 -0.000167 0.0102
[0.00492] [0.0529] [0.0274] [0.00884]
Salience -0.0193 0.179 0.0468 -0.0103
[0.0172] [0.160] [0.0850] [0.0294]
Salience x average reported 0.00603 -0.0544 -0.0199 0.00347
[0.00511] [0.0508] [0.0269] [0.00858]
Average reported 0.0966*** 1.129*** 0.563*** 0.0721***
[0.00420] [0.0471] [0.0244] [0.00710]
Observations 12,641 12,337 12,230 12,519
Classroom Fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.411 0.319 0.299 0.193
Note: This Table reports heterogeneous treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages by students’ aver-
age reported scores on four administrative dependent variables: attendance in math classes (Column 1); math GPA (Column
2); grade promotion rate (=1 if the student advanced to high school, and 0 otherwise; Column 3) and math standardized test
scores (Column 4). GPA and standardized test scores were normalized relative to the distribution of the comparison group.
All Columns include dummies indicating students whose parents received child-specific information and salience messages, and
interactions between these treatment variables and average reported attendance. Students’ controls include gender, age, race,
baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income and education. We also con-
trol for classroom fixed-effects. All columns are OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if
p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Table F.2: Heterogeneous treatment effects by average platform scores (punctuality)
Reported punctuality
Math Math Math standardized Grade
attendance GPA test score promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Child-specific information -0.0264 -0.380 -0.203 -0.130**
[0.0310] [0.274] [0.147] [0.0519]
Child-specific information x average reported 0.00725 0.111 0.0556 0.0338**
[0.00802] [0.0732] [0.0395] [0.0133]
Salience -0.0433* 0.0191 -0.0447 -0.0931*
[0.0250] [0.239] [0.129] [0.0527]
Salience x average reported 0.0117* 0.00199 0.00914 0.0252*
[0.00650] [0.0639] [0.0344] [0.0136]
Average reported 0.0718*** 1.363*** 0.675*** 0.0962***
[0.00659] [0.0777] [0.0482] [0.0119]
Observations 12,208 11,913 11,808 12,096
Classroom Fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.248 0.279 0.263 0.193
Note: This Table reports heterogeneous treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages by students’ aver-
age reported scores on four administrative dependent variables: attendance in math classes (Column 1); math GPA (Column
2); grade promotion rate (=1 if the student advanced to high school, and 0 otherwise; Column 3) and math standardized test
scores (Column 4). GPA and standardized test scores were normalized relative to the distribution of the comparison group.
All Columns include dummies indicating students whose parents received child-specific information and salience messages, and
interactions between these treatment variables and average reported punctuality. Students’ controls include gender, age, race,
baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income and education. We also con-
trol for classroom fixed-effects. All columns are OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if
p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
Table F.3: Heterogeneous treatment effects by average platform scores (homework com-
pletion)
Reported homework completion
Math Math Math standardized Grade
attendance GPA test score promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Child-specific information -0.0231 -0.115 -0.0740 -0.0462
[0.0175] [0.147] [0.0802] [0.0338]
Child-specific information x average reported 0.00650 0.0315 0.0178 0.0123
[0.00491] [0.0450] [0.0244] [0.00936]
Salience -0.0341* -0.00518 -0.0340 -0.0206
[0.0177] [0.142] [0.0770] [0.0352]
Salience x average reported 0.0103** 0.00474 0.00686 0.00591
[0.00493] [0.0432] [0.0236] [0.00986]
Average reported 0.0528*** 1.687*** 0.847*** 0.0967***
[0.00393] [0.0425] [0.0230] [0.00859]
Observations 12,025 11,737 11,624 11,922
Classroom Fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.277 0.522 0.497 0.244
Note: This Table reports heterogeneous treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages by students’ aver-
age reported scores on four administrative dependent variables: attendance in math classes (Column 1); math GPA (Column
2); grade promotion rate (=1 if the student advanced to high school, and 0 otherwise; Column 3) and math standardized test
scores (Column 4). GPA and standardized test scores were normalized relative to the distribution of the comparison group.
All Columns include dummies indicating students whose parents received child-specific information and salience messages, and
interactions between these treatment variables and average reported homework completion. Students’ controls include gender,
age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income and education. We
also control for classroom fixed-effects. All columns are OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the classroom level.
* if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
As one would expect, attending classes more often and handing in homework more fre-
quently correlates with better educational outcomes across the board. Also in line with the
literature, the effects of information are negative when the message bears bad news, and
positive otherwise: the coefficient of the interaction of information with average content
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reported is always positive when it comes to punctuality and homework completion, and
either 0 or positive when it comes to attendance (although most coefficients are not sta-
tistically significant). We find that the effects of salience messages follow exactly the same
pattern as those of information, even in the absence of direct inputs for belief updating.
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G [Supplementary Appendix] Heterogeneous treatment ef-
fects by gender
This Appendix presents heterogeneous effects for boys and girls. Throughout, we restrict
attention to a sample of 9,539 students with non-missing data for parents’ behavior and
aspirations, student behavior, and school transcripts and test scores.
Table G.1 starts by documenting aggregate treatment effects on educational outcomes
for this sub-sample. Next, Table G.2 breaks those estimates down by student gender.
Tables G.3, G.4 and G.5 follow by presenting results by student gender for treatment
effects on parental engagement and aspirations, and on students’ time use.
Table G.1: Average treatment effects on administrative educational outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Math Promotion Math
Attendance GPA Rate Standardized
(p.p.) (std.) (p.p.) Test (std.)
Child-specific information 0.017*** 0.058* 0.026** 0.091*
[0.006] [0.034] [0.012] [0.053]
Salience 0.016*** 0.072** 0.030** 0.075
[0.006] [0.034] [0.012] [0.053]
Control Mean 0.889 0.000 0.945 0.000
P-value diff. [Info] -[Salience] 0.634 0.420 0.477 0.510
Sample Size 9539 9539 9539 9539
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The Table displays treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages on the
following administrative outcomes: 4th-quarter attendance in math classes (Column 1); 4th-quarter
math GPA (Column 2); grade promotion rate (=1 if the student advanced to high school, and 0 oth-
erwise; Column 3), and math standardized test scores (Column 4). The sample is restricted to the
sample of students with non-missing data for parents’ behavior and aspirations, student behavior,
and school transcripts and test scores. GPA and standardized test scores were normalized relative
to the distribution of the pure control group. Students’ controls include gender, age, race, baseline
grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income and educa-
tion. We also control for randomization strata fixed-effects, and include an indicator variable for the
within-classroom control group. All columns are OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table G.3: Treatment effects on parental engagement - Boys vs. Girls
Boys Girls Diff. (Girls)-(Boys)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Academic Incentives Talk Academic Incentives Talk Academic Incentives Talk
activities activities activities
Child-specific information 0.13** 0.05 0.17*** 0.05 0.09 0.12** -0.08 0.03 -0.04
[ 0.06] [ 0.06] [ 0.05] [ 0.07] [ 0.06] [ 0.06] [ 0.08] [ 0.08] [ 0.07]
Salience 0.13** 0.07 0.14*** 0.00 0.11* 0.11* -0.12* 0.04 -0.03
[ 0.06] [ 0.06] [ 0.05] [ 0.06] [ 0.06] [ 0.06] [ 0.07] [ 0.08] [ 0.07]
Control Mean -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.00
P-value diff. [Info] -[Salience] 0.86 0.66 0.43 0.21 0.48 0.63
Sample Size 4654 4654 4654 4885 4885 4885
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This Table displays heterogeneous treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages on parental engagement by students’ gender. Vari-
ables are based on students end-line survey. They were asked to state how often their parents engage in certain activities (never, almost never, sometimes, almost
always, always). Out of the 12 questions, factor analysis was performed to create 3 variables of parental behavior: academic activities (help with homework, help
to organize school material, participate in school-parent meetings, talk to the teachers); incentives (incentivize to not miss school, to not be late, to study and to
read); talk (ask about homework, ask about grades, ask about day in school and classes). Variables were normalized relative to the distribution of the comparison
group (pure control). Students’ controls include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income
and education. We also control for randomization strata fixed-effects, and include an indicator variable for the within-classroom control group. All columns are OLS
regressions, with standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
Table G.4: Treatment effects on parents’ aspirations - Boys vs. Girls
Boys Girls Diff. (Girls)-(Boys)
(1) (2)
Parents’ Aspirations Parents’ Aspirations Parents’ Aspirations
College College College
Child-specific information 0.10* 0.09* -0.02
[ 0.06] [ 0.05] [ 0.08]
Salience 0.12** 0.08 -0.04
[ 0.06] [ 0.05] [ 0.08]
Control Mean -0.09 0.09
P-value diff. [Info] -[Salience] 0.76 0.79
Sample Size 4654 4885
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes
Note: This Table displays heterogeneous treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages on parental as-
pirations by students’ gender. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for parents’ aspirations that indicates whether
students answered that their parents expect them to go to college or not. Students’ controls include gender, age, race, base-
line grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income and education. We also control
for randomization strata fixed-effects, and include an indicator variable for the within-classroom control group. All columns
are OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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Table G.5: Treatment effects on students’ time use - Boys vs. Girls
Boys Girls Diff. (Girls)-(Boys)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Academic Reading Other Academic Reading Other Academic Reading Other
activities activities activities activities activities activities activities activities activities
Child-specific information 0.18*** 0.15** -0.13* 0.12* 0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 0.04
[ 0.05] [ 0.07] [ 0.07] [ 0.07] [ 0.08] [ 0.07] [ 0.07] [ 0.08] [ 0.08]
Salience 0.19*** 0.17** -0.09 0.06 0.06 -0.13** -0.13* -0.11 -0.04
[ 0.06] [ 0.07] [ 0.06] [ 0.07] [ 0.07] [ 0.07] [ 0.07] [ 0.08] [ 0.08]
Control Mean -0.14 -0.07 -0.18 0.14 0.08 0.18
P-value diff. [Info] -[Salience] 0.81 0.73 0.38 0.13 0.65 0.26
Sample Size 4654 4654 4654 4885 4885 4885
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This Table displays heterogeneous treatment effects of child-specific information and salience messages on students’ time-use by gender. Variables are based on
the end-line survey. Students were requested to answer how many hours per day (0, 15 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 hour, 2 hours, more than 2 hours) they spend in each of
the following activities: i. studying at home on weekdays; ii. studying at home on weekends; iii. studying at home the day before a test; iv. reading a book; v. reading
the newspaper; vi. reading magazines; vii. watching TV; viii. navigating on the internet or social media; and ix. helping with housework. Factor analysis was performed
to create three variables of student’s behavior: academic activities (items i, ii and iii); reading activities (items iv, v and vi) and other activities (items vii, viii and ix).
Variables were normalized relative to the distribution of the comparison group (pure control), such that the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group is
zero and one, respectively. Students’ controls include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race, family income
and education. We also control for randomization strata fixed-effects, and include an indicator variable for the within-classroom control group. All columns are OLS
regressions, with standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
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H [Supplementary Appendix] Heterogeneous treatment ef-
fects by willingness to receive information
Willingness to receive information was also measured at the baseline survey. Parents were
asked at baseline about their interest in receiving information about their child’s school
attendance, given the following options: no interest, some interest, or great interest (see
Supplementary Appendix J). We define low willingness to receive information as an indi-
cator variable equal to 1 if a parent expressed no or some interest in receiving information
about school attendance, and 0 otherwise.
Table H.1 presents heterogeneous treatment effects by splitting the sample according
to this indicator variable. The lower sample size reflects the fact that we can only use
parents who answer our baseline phone survey in this table.
Table H.1: Heterogeneity by parents’ willingness to receive information (WTR)
School Transcripts and Test Scores Parents’ Beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Math Promotion Math Accuracy Accuracy
Attendance GPA Rate Standardized Math Math
(p.p.) (std.) (p.p.) Test (std.) Attendance (p.p.) GPA (p.p.)
Low willingness to receive information (WTR) ( 63.3%)
Child-specific information 0.03*** 0.09* 0.04** 0.16** -0.03 0.02
[ 0.01] [ 0.05] [ 0.02] [ 0.07] [ 0.04] [ 0.04]
Salience 0.03*** 0.12** 0.03* 0.08 0.02 0.10**
[ 0.01] [ 0.05] [ 0.02] [ 0.07] [ 0.04] [ 0.04]
Control Mean 0.86 -0.06 0.93 -0.05 0.21 0.23
P-value diff. [Info] -[Salience] 0.57 0.42 0.56 0.10 0.13 0.04
Sample Size 2578 2578 2578 2578 1071 1071
High willingness to receive information (WTR) ( 36.7%)
Child-specific information 0.04*** 0.15** 0.07*** 0.07 -0.16** 0.04
[ 0.01] [ 0.07] [ 0.02] [ 0.10] [ 0.07] [ 0.08]
Salience 0.04*** 0.18*** 0.07*** 0.14 -0.15** 0.02
[ 0.01] [ 0.07] [ 0.02] [ 0.10] [ 0.07] [ 0.08]
Control Mean 0.86 0.04 0.91 0.07 0.36 0.33
P-value diff. [Info] -[Salience] 0.89 0.46 0.70 0.24 0.67 0.75
Sample Size 1317 1317 1317 1317 620 620
Randomization strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Parents were asked at baseline about their interest in receiving information about their child’s attendance. They could express no interest,
some interest, or high interest. Parents who expressed no or some interest were defined as low-WTR, while parents who expressed high interest
were defined as high-WTR. GPA normalized relative to the distribution of the pure control group.Parents were asked at end line for their best esti-
mate of how many times their child missed school over the 4th quarter, and what was their child’s 4th-quarter math GPA. Data was then checked
against administrative records; we define accuracy as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the parent chose the right bracket for attendance/GPA,
and 0 otherwise. Students’ controls include gender, age, race, baseline grades and attendance, and caregivers’ controls include gender, age, race,
family income and education. We also control for randomization strata fixed-effects, and include an indicator variable for the within-classroom
control group. All columns are OLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * if p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** if p<0.01.
Willingness to receive information indicator (WTR) indeed seems to capture parents
demand for information: while low-WTR parents do not update beliefs about children’s
attendance in response to text messages, those with high-WTR do.50 What is more, both
50The negative treatment effects on accuracy about attendance are linked to the mismatch between the
89
salience and information treatments have positive and statistically significant effects even
for low-WTR parents. Third, and most strikingly, the ratio of salience to information
effects is actually systematically higher for parents with high WTR, which is consistent
with attention being the primary mechanism behind the effects of communication. The
reason is that, in line with Chassang et al. (2012), parents with higher demand for in-
formation should be those who exert higher effort to acquire it within the setting of the
randomized control trial. Salience effects are magnified among those parents to a greater
extent than information effects, highlighting the complementary nature between attention
and decentralized information acquisition by parents.
time span at which we conveyed information about attendance (“over the last 3 weeks”) and that for which
we could verify attendance at endline (over the last quarter), as in the main text.
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I [Supplementary Appendix] Pre-analysis plan
Our pre-analysis registered at the AEA RCT Registry is presented in full in subsections
I.1 through I.4. Subsection I.5 highlights the elements of the analyses that deviate from
what had been specified in that pre-analysis plan.
I.1 Background
While there is increasing evidence that enhancing the communication between schools and
parents significantly improves students’ performance, less is known about what mecha-
nisms drive those effects. Is it because, by providing parents with information about their
children’s effort, communication primarily alleviates the moral hazard problem between
parents and children? Or is it because parents have limited attention, and communication
makes parenting “top of mind”?
This paper attempts to decompose the effects of communicating with parents into
those two mechanisms. Specifically, we investigate whether informing parents about their
children’s attendance, tardiness and assignment completion, improves students’ outcomes
above and beyond the effects of communication aimed at increasing awareness about those
dimensions of children’s effort. The distinction matters: providing timely and accurate
information about children’s behavior requires integrated systems and customized com-
munication, which can be quite costly, particularly in developing countries. Conversely,
simply nudging to raise awareness does not require any information systems in place.
Our experiment has Math teachers fill in information about students’ attendance, tar-
diness and assignment completion, and then randomly assigns within classroom what in-
formation is conveyed to each parent over SMS. Parents in the control group receive no
SMS; those in the awareness treatment group receive only general statements about the
relevance of monitoring their child’s behavior (e.g.: “Attending classes every day is impor-
tant for Nina’s grades”); and those in the awareness + information treatment group receive
what the teacher informed about their child (e.g.: “Nina was absent less than 3 times in
the previous 3 weeks”). The questions of interest are whether awareness alone improves
student’s attendance, grades, and drop-out rates, and to what extent adding pupil-level
information further improves those outcomes.
I.2 Intervention, sample and outcomes
Communication interventions are randomly assigned at the school and student levels,
within a sample of 223 Brazilian public schools, in order to estimate the impacts of each of
those mechanisms on parental engagement and students’ outcomes. The ninth grade is a
crucial period in the school cycle of Brazilian schools: it is the last grade before high-school,
and dropout rates are very high.
We will deliver content through sequences of text messages (SMS), alternating the
dimensions of children’s effort—attendance, tardiness and assignments completion. The
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intervention’s treatment arms are as follows:
1) [Awareness treatment] General statements about attendance, tardiness and assign-
ment completion (e.g. “attending school is important”) – T1
2) [Awareness + information treatment] Child-level attendance, tardiness and assign-
ment completion – T2
Comparing T2 to T1 and T1 to control allows separating the effects of information and
awareness.
There are two main concerns about how this design may potentially underplay the
effects of information. The first is that parents may already have (to a reasonable extent)
information about their child, such that the key piece of information missing is how to
place their child relatively to his or her classmates. In fact, other studies often focus on
relative behavior: e.g. Rogers and Feller (2016) inform parents about how their children’s
attendance fares relatively to his/her classroom modal attendance.
To deal with this concern, we pursue two strategies. First, we survey parents at baseline
about their best guess for their child’s attendance, tardiness and assignment completion, so
as to investigate heterogeneity of treatment effects by baseline accuracy (Annex 2). Second,
for a sub-sample of schools, we add an alternative awareness + information treatment that
conveys parents both with pupil- and classroom-level information, to test whether that
treatment has additional effects.
3) [Awareness + relative information treatment] Child- and classroom-level attendance,
tardiness and assignment completion – T3
The second concern is contamination, or peer effects. While there is a concern that
assigning different treatments within the same classroom may lead to contamination, we
are less worried about it in this setting parents typically have no recurring interactions
at this age – most of them no longer take their children to school, and parent-teacher
meetings are rather infrequent in Brazilian public schools. However, peer effects may lead
us to underestimate treatment effects. To deal with this concern, our design varies the
exposure to the different treatments across different sub-samples of schools, allowing us to
estimate spillovers. Randomization will be performed in two steps. First, schools will be
randomly assigned to 4 different sub-samples (A-D), determining the treatment arms each
school will have access. Then, students will be randomized within class to each treatment
arm:
A. Pure control – 25 schools
B. T1 + control – 25 schools
C. T1 + T2 + control – 100 schools
D. T1 + T2 + T3 + control – 50 schools
Sub-sample C allows separating the effects of information and awareness; sub-samples A
and B allow estimating spillover effects. Sub-sample D is meant to address the concern
about relative vs. absolute child-level information. In order to collect cellphones and
information from parents in the control group, and also to control for the proportion of
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parents registered in the program, we will offer the control and the treatment group access
to send school events through the platform.
Figure I.1: Research Design
A web-platform was created specifically to this project and was designed in a simple
and intuitive way so schools could easily manage it. Treatment and control schools will
have access to the event feature, allowing them to notify parents of two school events per
month. Once the principal registers the event, the system will send two SMS notifications
to parents: one week prior and one day prior to the event. Math teachers from treatment
schools will be oriented to fill in the platform every week with that week’s dimension
of students’ behavior: attendance, tardiness or assignment completion. Teachers will fill
information regarding student behavior on each dimension considering the past three weeks.
The system requires teachers to fill in information for all students.
Figure I.2: School Platform
Teachers and schools are not aware of their assignment, nor of parents’ assignment.
For treatment arm T3, the platform computes the class median once the teacher submits
all students’ information every week. As for treatment arm T1, although teacher will fill
in child-level information every week, parents will only receive general information aimed
at raising awareness about that dimension of children’s effort. Parents of all treatment
arms only receive the text message if the teacher had completed the platform that week.
This is true even for T1, in order to avoid confounding treatment effects with teachers’
non-compliance. After teachers have filled the platform until Sunday of each week, parents
will receive the following message on Tuesdays, according to their treatment status:
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Figure I.3: SMS examples
The content of the messages are simple and clear and messages across treatment arms
were designed to have a similar length (number of characters). Each week teachers will
receive a text message, reminding them which dimension they should fill in that week.
Moreover, teachers who miss one week will receive an alert, emphasizing they did not fill
the platform that week and encouraging them to fill in the following week. Principals
will receive motivational messages, encouraging them to engage teachers in the program,
as well as message alters, if the usage in the school is low. The study relies on four
main stakeholders, who will contribute to the success of the intervention: the São Paulo
Secretariat of Education, the Regional Board of Education Directors, school principals and
teachers. São Paulo is the most populous state in Brazil and it is divided in 91 Regional
Boards of Education. Each Region has an Education Director. In this project, we will
work with five Regional Boards of Education. Education Directors will play an import roll
of engaging schools in the program.
The implementation of the intervention involves five steps. First, on April 14th we had
a meeting with the five Education Directors, as well as the team of São Paulo Secretariat
of Education to present the project. Second, on the following two weeks, Directors pre-
sented the project to their schools, inviting them to participate. Participation rate was
87%. Third, between May 9 and May 17 we had meetings with the school principals and
Education Director, in each of the Regional Board of Education head offices, to explain
the project and distribute the enrollment material and instructions. Forth, the schools
organized parental meetings, to explain the project and enroll parents in the program,
collecting their cell-phone, as well as other information. For parents who did not attend
the meeting, the material was sent home trough the student. Fifth, Math teachers had
two weeks to register parents’ information in the system. Schools and students were then
randomized to treatments and control groups and teachers began to fill the platform on
the week of June 13th. The school year in Brazil runs from February to December, with




We will conduct surveys through automated voice calls (Interactive Voice Response, IVR)
at the end of the intervention to collect self-reported parenting practices and parents’
views about their children. We conducted a baseline survey through IVR on the week of
June 16th, surveying parents about their demand for information, as well their previous
knowledge about their kids. At the end of the project, we will be able to investigate if
treatment effects are heterogeneous by the accuracy of prior knowledge about children’s
behavior and the ones by ex-ante demand for information about child-level behavior.
One interesting lesson from our 2015 pilot is that, at least among 6th grades, about 1/3
of participating families’ children also have cell phones, which lead us to collect student’s
cell phones for this study. We were able to collect cell phones for 50% of the students.
Among these families, we track students’ views about themselves, their parents and their
teachers. At the end of the intervention, the São Paulo Education Secretariat will provide
data on student attendance and grades in 2016 (per quarter), and enrollment in 2017.
Moreover, the Secretariat implements an yearly standardized test to all schools in the
state of São Paulo, SARESP (System of School Performance Evaluation of the State of
São Paulo). All students in grades 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th of primary school and the 3rd
(final) year of high school are tested on their knowledge of Mathematics and Portuguese.
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I.4 Timeline and milestones
Figure I.4: Timeline & Milestones
I.5 Deviations from the pre-analysis plan
In the paper, we present all results of the hypotheses’ tests pre-specified in that document
(some of which are relegated to the supplementary appendices).
There are four main differences between the analyses we undertake in the paper and
those that were pre-specified.
First, terminology. For ease of exposition, in the paper we distinguish between salience
messages and child-specific information, while in the pre-analysis plan we referred to the
former as “awareness” messages and to the latter as “awareness + information” messages.
Nothing changed in terms of the analyses; we just clarify the difference to guide the reader
in their examination of the pre-analysis plan.
Second, sub-sample E (nudges) was not included in the pre-analysis plan. It was
added later, covering a different set of schools (not statistically identical at baseline to
the other sub-samples), to allow us to rule out that treatment effects were merely driven
by differential teacher behavior across treated schools and pure control schools. As the
analyses of treatment effects comparing educational outcomes in this sub-sample to those
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in the pure control group is non-experimental (rather, estimated using a differences-in-
differences strategy), we did not amend the pre-analysis plan at the time.
Third, the number of schools assigned to each sub-sample does not correspond exactly
to those in the pre-analysis plan. The reason is that we ended up having access to a larger
number of schools than we had foreseen at the time. The proportion of schools assigned
to each group is, however, nearly identical to that of the pre-analysis plan.
Fourth, we incorporated some additional analyses in order to generate results compa-
rable to the literature. Specifically, the analyses of how the interventions affect the slope of
beliefs as a function of actual absences, in Sections 4 and 6.2, and of how the interventions
induce conditional impacts with respect to student effort, in Section 5.3, closely follow
Dizon-Ross (2019).
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J [Supplementary Appendix] Survey instruments
J.1 Baseline Survey: Parents
"Thank you for participating in the research about parental engagement in student ed-
ucation! Answer the following questions by dialing on your cellphone. This survey is
anonymous and free and if you answer all the questions you will receive 5 reais in cellphone
credit in your pre-paid phone. You will answer only 11 questions!”
1. How many times does your child usually miss Math class in a one-month period? If
none, press 1; if between 1 and 3 times, press 2; if between 4 and 6 times, press 3; if more
than 6 times, press 4.
2. How many times is your child usually late to Math class in a one-month period? If
none, press 1; if between 1 and 3 times, press 2; if between 4 and 6 times, press 3; if more
than 6 times, press 4.
3. How many times does your child usually hand in Math assignments on time in a
one-month period? If none, press 1; if between 1 and 3 times, press 2; if between 4 and 6
times, press 3; if more than 6 times, press 4.
4. How does your child usually behave in Math class? If very well, press 1; if well,
press 2; if appropriately, press 3; if inappropriately, press 4.
5. Usually, how is your child’s performance in Math class? If very good, press 1; if
good, press 2; if adequate, press 3; if inadequate, press 4.
If your child’s school initiated a program to inform parents and guardians about the
school life of students, what would be your interest in receiving information about each of
the following?
6. About the number of Math classes missed? Press 1 if you would be very interested,
press 2 if you would be somewhat interested; press 3 if you would not be interested.
7. About the number of Math classes he/she was late for? Press 1 if you would be
very interested, press 2 if you would be somewhat interested; press 3 if you would not be
interested.
8. About the number of Math assignments he/she failed to hand on time? Press 1 if
you would be very interested, press 2 if you would be somewhat interested; press 3 if you
would not be interested.
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9. About his/her behavior in Math class? Press 1 if you would be very interested, press
2 if you would be somewhat interested; press 3 if you would not be interested.
10. About his/her performance in Math class? Press 1 if you would be very interested,
press 2 if you would be somewhat interested; press 3 if you would not be interested.
11. About activities you could perform at home with your child, to increase parental
engagement? Press 1 if you would be very interested, press 2 if you would be somewhat
interested; press 3 if you would not be interested.
Final message: "Thank you! Your air credit will be delivered within 7 days!”
J.2 End-line Survey: Parents
"Thank you for participating in SMS ESCOLA research about parental engagement in
student education! Answer the following questions by dialing on your cellphone. This
survey is anonymous and free and if you answer all the questions you will receive 5 reais
in cellphone credit in your pre-paid phone!”
1. Did you receive weekly text messages from the school in the last six-months? If yes,
press 1; if no, press 2.
If the answer is 1 (yes) – 2A & 3A:
2.A. Did you talk with the professor or other parents about the text messages you
received from the school? If yes, press 1; if no, press 2.
3.A. Did you show the text messages to your child? If yes, press 1; if no, press 2.
If the answer is 2 (no) – 2B & 3B):
2.B. Did you hear that some of the parents were receiving text messages from the school
or did you talk with the professors or other parents about the text messages? If yes, press
1; if no, press 2.
3.B. Did any parent show you the content of these text messages? If yes, press 1; if no,
press 2.
4A. Now answer how often you do each of the following things. Help your child with
schoolwork or homework? If never, press 1; if almost never, press 2; if sometimes, press 3;
if always or almost always, press 4.
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4B. Now answer how often you do each of the following things. Help your child to
organize school material, such as books, notebooks and backpack? If never, press 1; if
almost never, press 2; if sometimes, press 3; if always or almost always, press 4.
5A. Incentivize your child to not miss school? If never, press 1; if almost never, press
2; if sometimes, press 3; if always or almost always, press 4.
5B. Incentivize your child to not be late for school? If never, press 1; if almost never,
press 2; if sometimes, press 3; if always or almost always, press 4.
6A. Talk to your child about his day in school? If never, press 1; if almost never, press
2; if sometimes, press 3; if always or almost always, press 4.
6B. Talk to your child about his classes? If never, press 1; if almost never, press 2; if
sometimes, press 3; if always or almost always, press 4.
7A. Go to school parent meetings? If never, press 1; if almost never, press 2; if some-
times, press 3; if always or almost always, press 4.
7B. Talk to your child’s teachers, for any reason. If never, press 1; if almost never,
press 2; if sometimes, press 3; if always or almost always, press 4.
8. Thinking about your child’s Math class, answer each of the following questions with
your best guess. On average, how many Math classes did your child miss in the last quar-
ter? If none, press 0; if less than 3, press 1; if between 3 and 5, press 2; if between 6 and
8, press 3; if more than 8, press 5.
9. What was your child’s Math grade in the last quarter? Press a number between 0
and 10 and then pound.
10. Now thinking about your child’s Portuguese class, answer each of the following
questions with your best guess. On average, how many Portuguese classes did your child
miss in the last quarter? If none, press 0; if less than 3, press 1; if between 3 and 5, press
2; if between 6 and 8, press 3; if more than 8, press 5.
11. What was your child’s Portuguese grade in the last quarter? Press a number be-
tween 0 and 10 and then pound.
12. If a professor suggests a list of books for your child to read during vacations, would
you buy it? If you would buy it if they were required, press 1; if you would buy it even if
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they were optional, press 2; or if you would not buy it, press 3.
13. Answer if you agree or disagree with the following statements. "Experiencing fail-
ure debilitates my performance and productivity.” If you strongly disagree, press 1; if you
disagree, press 2; if you somewhat disagree, press 3; if you somewhat agree, press 4; if you
agree, press 5; or if you strongly agree, press 6.
14. "Experiencing failure inhibits my learning and growth.” If you strongly disagree,
press 1; if you disagree, press 2; if you somewhat disagree, press 3; if you somewhat agree,
press 4; if you agree, press 5; or if you strongly agree, press 6.
15. "Experiencing failure enhances my performance and productivity.” If you strongly
disagree, press 1; if you disagree, press 2; if you somewhat disagree, press 3; if you some-
what agree, press 4; if you agree, press 5; or if you strongly agree, press 6.
16. "The effects of failure are negative and should be avoided.” If you strongly disagree,
press 1; if you disagree, press 2; if you somewhat disagree, press 3; if you somewhat agree,
press 4; if you agree, press 5; or if you strongly agree, press 6.
Final message: "Thank you! Your air credit will be delivered within 7 days, and you
will receive a text message confirmation when it is available!”
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J.3 End-line Survey: Students






           Check here, if the name printed above is NOT yours, notify the administrator immediately         
Dear student, 
This questionnaire should be answered with great care. We want to know more about families' engagement habits and your study 
habits. You can be sure that your family, your colleagues and your school teachers will not know any of your answers, so please 
answer honestly. Your answers will contribute to a better future for you and other young people in our State. If you do not understand 
a question, please call the administrator, but do not stop answering! There are no right or wrong answers! Thank you! 
 






a. Help you with homework or schoolwork.   1 2 3 4 
b. Ask if you did you homework or schoolwork 1 2 3 4 
c. Help you to organize the school material, such as books, notebooks and backpack. 1 2 3 4 
d. Incentivize you to not miss school. 1 2 3 4 
e. Incentivize you to not be late for school. 1 2 3 4 
f. Ask you about your grades in tests, activities and classes. 1 2 3 4 
g. Incentivize you to study. 1 2 3 4 
h. Incentivize you to read. 1 2 3 4 
i. Ask you about your day in school. 1 2 3 4 
j. Ask you about your classes.  1 2 3 4 
k. Go to school parent meetings. 1 2 3 4 
l. Talk to your teachers.   1 2 3 4 
 










a. How smart you are is something that you can’t change very much. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. You can learn new things, but you can’t change how smart you really 
are. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
c. You can always change how smart you are. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. You have a certain degree of intelligence  and you can’t really do 
much to change it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
e. My parents ask me how my work in school compares with the work of 
other students in my class. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
f. My parents would be pleased if I could show that school is easy for 
me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
g. My parents would like it if I could show that I’m smarter than other 
students in my class. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
h. My parents don’t like it when I make mistakes in school. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
i. My parents want me to understand school concepts, not just do the 
work. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
j. My parents think how hard I work in school is more important than the 
grades I get. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
k. My parents would like me to do hard work, even if I make mistakes. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
l. My parents want me to understand homework problems, not just 
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3. Answer if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: (answer thinking 








a. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 1 2 3 4 
b. At times, I think I am no good at all. 1 2 3 4 
c. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.  1 2 3 4 
d. I am able to do things as well as most other people.  1 2 3 4 
e. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 1 2 3 4 
f. I feel useless at times.  1 2 3 4 
g. Sometimes I feel that I'm a worthless person.  1 2 3 4 
h. I wish I could have more respect for myself.  1 2 3 4 
i. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.  1 2 3 4 
j. I have a positive attitude toward myself.  1 2 3 4 
 
 
4. Answer how you feel for each of the statements below. Do you like that your parents or guardians:  I like it a lot 






a. Help you with homework or schoolwork? 1 2 3 4 
b. Ask you about your day in school? 1 2 3 4 
c. Help you to organize school material, such as books, notebooks and backpack? 1 2 3 4 
d. Ask you about your grades on tests, on assignments and in classes? 1 2 3 4 
e. Go to school parent meetings? 1 2 3 4 
f. Incentivize you to not miss school? 1 2 3 4 
g. Incentivize you to not be late for school? 1 2 3 4 
 
 
5. Indicate how much you identify with each of the statements below (there are no 










Not like me 
at all 
a. New ideas and projects sometimes distract me from previous ones.  1 2 3 4 5 
b. Setbacks (delays and obstacles) don’t discourage me.   1 2 3 4 5 
c. I have been obsessed with a certain idea or project for a short time but later lost 
interest.   1 2 3 4 5 
d. I am a hard worker.   1 2 3 4 5 
e. I often set a goal but later choose to pursue (follow) a different one.   1 2 3 4 5 
f. I have difficulty maintaining (keeping) my focus on projects that take more than a few 
months to complete.   1 2 3 4 5 
g. I finish whatever I begin.  1 2 3 4 5 
h. I’m hard working and careful.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6. In general, indicate how much time per day you spend in each of the 
following activities: 













a. Study at home, on weekdays. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. Study at home, on weekends.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
c. Study at home, the day before a test. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. Watch TV. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
e. Read a book. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
f. Read the newspaper. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
g. Read magazines.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
h. On the internet or social media.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
i. Help with housework in YOUR HOUSE (clean the house, laundry, dishes, take 






7. Answer if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: Strongly disagree Disagree Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
a. I like the MATH class. 1 2 3 4 
b. I like the PORTUGUESE class. 1 2 3 4 
Your MATH teacher…  
c. Doesn’t like that students are late for class. 1 2 3 4 
d. Doesn’t like that students miss class. 1 2 3 4 
e. Is strict about the delivery of homework or schoolwork. 1 2 3 4 
f. Is rigorous in test grading.  1 2 3 4 
g. Is rigorous in report card grading. 1 2 3 4 
         Your PORTUGUESE teacher…  
k. Doesn’t like that students are late for class. 1 2 3 4 
l. Doesn’t like that students miss class. 1 2 3 4 
m. Is strict about the delivery of homework or schoolwork. 1 2 3 4 
n. Is rigorous in test grading. 1 2 3 4 
o. Is rigorous in report card grading. 1 2 3 4 
 
8. Answer from 1 to 4 how important each of the items below are to you (there are 








a. Doing the homework or schoolwork. 1 2 3 4 
b. Studying for tests. 1 2 3 4 
c. Having a good performance on tests. 1 2 3 4 
d. Getting a good grade on the report card. 1 2 3 4 
e. Not missing class. 1 2 3 4 
f. Not being late for class. 1 2 3 4 
g. Finishing elementary school. 1 2 3 4 
h. Finishing high school. 1 2 3 4 
i. Going to college.  1 2 3 4 
j. Getting a good job. 1 2 3 4 
 
9. If it were only up to you, up to which level you would 
study? 
 10. If it were only up to your parents, up to which level you would 
study? 
a. I would have already dropped out 
of school 1 
 a. I would have already dropped out of school. 1 
b. Until finishing the 9o grade. 2  b. Until finishing the 9o grade. 2 
c. Until finishing high school. 3  c. Until finishing high school. 3 
d. Until, at least, finishing college. 4  d. Until, at least, finishing college. 4 
 
11. And what do you think will really happen? 
a. I will drop out of school before finishing the 9o grade. 1 
b. I will finish the 9o grade of elementary school. 2 
c. I will finish high school. 3 
d. I will finish college.  4 
 
12. Answer yes or no for each of the questions below: Yes No 
a. Did you hear that some parents were receiving text messages from your school? 1 2 
















a. How confident are you that you can complete all the work that is assigned in your 
classes?  1 2 3 4 5 
b. When complicated ideas are presented in class, how confident are you that you 
can understand them?  1 2 3 4 5 
c. How confident are you that you can learn all the material presented in your 
classes?  1 2 3 4 5 
d. How confident are you that you can do the hardest work that is assigned in your 
classes?  1 2 3 4 5 
e. How confident are you that you will remember what you learned in your current 
classes, next year?  1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. To answer the questions below, think of how you compare to most people. For the 
following statements, please indicate how often you did the following during the 













once a day 
a. I forgot something I needed for class.   1 2 3 4 5 
b. I interrupted other students while they were talking.   1 2 3 4 5 
c. I said something rude.   1 2 3 4 5 
d. I couldn't find something because my desk, locker, or bedroom was messy.   1 2 3 4 5 
e. I lost my temper at home or at school.   1 2 3 4 5 
f. I did not remember what my teacher told me to do.   1 2 3 4 5 
g. My mind wandered when I should have been listening.   1 2 3 4 5 
h. I talked back to my teacher or parent when I was upset.   1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. Answer from 1 to 6 for the following questions, where 1 is a little and 6 is a lot.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
How much do you think that your MATH teacher takes each of the following items into account when 
defining your report card grade?  
a. Grades on tests. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. Grades on homework, schoolwork and activities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
c. Classroom participation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. Delivery of homework on time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
e. Absences. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
f. Lateness. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
g. If you disturbed your peers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
h. If you talked about non-class related subjects during class. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
i. Other characteristics of yours. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
How much do you think that your PORTUGUESE teacher takes each of the following items in account 
when defining your report card grade?  
j. Grades on tests. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
k. Grades on homework, schoolwork and activities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
l. Classroom participation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
m. Delivery of homework on time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
n. Absences. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
o. Lateness. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
p. If you disturbed your peers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
q. If you talked about non-class related subjects during class. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
r. Other characteristics of yours. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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